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In this first Chapter, an in-depth background is provided for the reader on forecasting and its 
pivotal role in today’s business world. The different methods (statistical, judgmental, combination), 
and their respective benefits will be highlighted. All three papers included here are aimed at unifying 
the strengths of judgmental and statistical forecasting. This doctoral thesis looks at a special situation, 
in which the potential of both can be realized: time series data, disturbed by exceptional events 
(promotions). At the beginning of this doctoral thesis, we set out to investigate combined judgmental 
and statistical forecasting in the real world. The dataset proved to be insightful and provided potential 
for thorough analysis. The combination used by the company involved was that of judgmental 
adjustment: a statistical model forecasted and a forecaster subsequently chose whether or not to 
adapt this forecast. In some cases, this adjustment was severely damaging to forecasting accuracy. 
Therefore, in a first study, we set out to apply a forecast support system that could mitigate this 
harmful effect. In other cases however, judgmental adjustment was beneficial to forecasting accuracy. 
To dig deeper into the beneficial effects of judgment in forecasting, we chose an experimental design 
in our second study. Unexpected, yet robust results required more investigation: judgment in itself 
outperformed the combination with statistics. Our third and final study digs deeper into this finding 
with a large-scale between-subjects experimental study. The quality of the statistical forecast was 
investigated, with its impact on different types of error. In the concluding chapter, these results are 




1. Literature background 
 
Forecasting is “[the] explicit processes for determining what is likely to happen in the future” 
(Armstrong, 1999, p. 192). Fischhoff (Fischhoff, 1994, p. 387) then defines a forecast as “a set of 
probabilities attached to a set of future events.” Forecasting is the driver of a wide variety of processes 
in the organization, including the introduction of new products, budget planning, and supply chain 
optimization (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007). For instance, the marketing department will forecast the 
expected number of sales, which will influence production planning, inventory, promotional planning, 
pricing, and financial prognosis (Smith, McIntyre, & Achabal, 1994). Improved sales forecasting may 
yield significant monetary savings, enhanced competitiveness and customer satisfaction (Fildes, 
Goodwin, & Lawrence, 2006; Moon, Mentzer, & Smith, 2003). Effective forecasting is thus a necessary 
skill in today’s business world (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007; Giullian, Odom, & Totaro, 2000). Business 
leaders realize that they must understand what the future holds if they are to effectively grasp 
opportunities and have a solid starting point for their strategy (Makadok & Walker, 2000; Makridakis 
& Gaba, 1998; Shim, 2000; Titus, Covin, & Slevin, 2011). If a company fails to identify important future 
events or critical changes correctly, there is little chance that its strategy and planning will be 
successful (Makridakis & Gaba, 1998). Given the complexity of the business environment, the amount 
of data organizations have at their disposal is immense. To remain competitive, it is then vital to have 
the skills and tools to sift efficiently through the large amounts of data gathered (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2011). 
Generally, forecasts are by experts (judgment), models, or a combination of both. The extant 
body of literature has focused on investigating the effects of these three types of forecasting on 
forecasting accuracy. Models can generate predictions based on the logical and systematic processing 
of information and can handle large amounts of data (Goodwin & Wright, 2010). The key advantage 
of models is that their predictions have a high degree of consistency and generate fewer errors than 
human judgment (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990). Models can thus improve forecasting performance by 
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increasing the consistency of predictions (Hoch & Schkade, 1996). However, when an error does occur, 
it is more likely to be large and impactful: small input errors can produce large output errors (Stewart, 
2001). Moreover, models are myopic; they fail to consider unexpected changes, and cannot deal with 
unstable environments or missing data (Armstrong & Collopy, 1998; Goodwin, 2002; Hughes, 2001; 
Taleb, 2007). In a world of change and uncertainty, this is especially troublesome (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2011; O’Connor, Remus, & Griggs, 1993). The model that best fits the historical data 
is also not necessarily the best fit for the future, implying that predictions based solely on historical 
data will not be sufficient, and do not guarantee future successes (Makridakis & Taleb, 2009). 
In contrast, experts are capable of identifying new variables that influence predictions and are 
capable of subjective assessment (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990). Yet, a wide range of errors, such as biases 
and inconsistencies (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), influence human judgment. Well 
known among researchers, these flaws represent a blind spot for the decision maker. Although we 
accept our limitations where memory is concerned (e.g., by making use of memory aids), no action is 
undertaken to counter our flawed judgment. Either people are unaware of their flaws and biases in 
judgment, or they are unwilling to accept them (Makridakis & Gaba, 1998). 
When experts and models interact, experimental evidence suggests that people often make 
unnecessary adjustments to statistical forecasts based on their own judgment, even when they have 
no additional information (Goodwin, 2000; Lawrence, Goodwin, O’Connor, & Önkal, 2006). This is 
hypothesized to be because of the human tendency to discern patterns in noise or random numbers 
(Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2009), or the illusion of control effect, where forecasters 
are too optimistic and place excess weight on positive signals (Durand, 2003; Kotteman, Davis, & 
Remus, 1994). Moreover, those making forecasts are in general overconfident in the accuracy of their 
forecasts (Arkes, 2001; Lawrence, et al., 2006) and suffer from self-serving attribution bias, whereby 
they overestimate the importance of their own judgment when making adjustments to statistical 
forecasts (Hilary & Hsu, 2011; Libby & Rennekamp, 2012). Surprisingly, in a study by Lim and O’Connor 
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(1995), the tendency to adjust forecasts persisted despite giving participants feedback on their 
declining accuracy. 
Reimers and Harvey (2011) summarize four factors leading to errors in forecasting. First, people 
tend to dampen trends in noisy series, thereby underestimating the steepness of trends in data series. 
This is arguably the result of an anchor-and-adjust heuristic, whereby people anchor on the last data 
point and then adjust (insufficiently) upwards (Bolger & Harvey, 1998; Harvey, 2007). Second, people 
tend to add noise of their own when making forecasts to make them more representative of the 
observed variation in the data (Harvey, 1995). Noise is thus really a problem for forecasters, given that 
it can mask any true patterns and lead to the misinterpretation of false signals (Goodwin & Fildes, 
1999). Third, trend damping occurs more in downwardly than upwardly trending series (Harvey & 
Bolger, 1996; O’Connor, Remus, & Griggs, 1997). Fourth, people presume independent data to be 
positively serially correlated (Bolger & Harvey, 1993). Next to these unconscious errors, deliberate 
violations are also possible. We find examples in managers of poorly performing firms known to 
increase earnings forecasts to improve market perceptions (Rogers & Stocken, 2005); with analysts, 
who influence their forecasts to maintain a good relationship with management (Libby, Hunton, Tan, 
& Seybert, 2008; Washburn & Bromiley, 2013); and with sales representatives, who intentionally 
overestimate future sales to ensure product availability (Todd, Crook, & Lachowetz, 2013). 
Despite these errors, studies have shown that human judgment is capable of improving on 
statistical models. Judgment enables human experts to process contextual information and 
environmental changes, which a model cannot (Cheikhrouhou, Marmier, Ayadi, & Wieser, 2011; 
Lawrence, et al., 2006; Whitecotton, Sanders, & Norris, 1998). Contextual information is what gives 
forecasting with judgment an edge over statistical forecasting, given that it can explain deviations in 
the data and identify future events that may cause anomalies (Armstrong & Collopy, 1998; Marmier 
& Cheikhrouhou, 2010). Webby and O’Connor (1996) confirm in their review of judgmental versus 
statistical forecasts that the accuracy of the judgmental process improves with contextual information 
or “domain knowledge.” The concept of domain knowledge, defined by Lawrence et al. (2006, p. 499) 
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is “…any information relevant to the forecasting task other than the time series—i.e. non-time series 
information.” 
In turn, this represents an un-modeled component in the statistical method. This can be, for 
instance, technical knowledge (knowledge about the data analysis and forecasting procedures), causal 
knowledge (an understanding of the cause-and-effect relationships involved), or product knowledge 
(Sanders & Ritzman, 1992; Webby & O’Connor, 1996). For example, domain experts may have 
knowledge of recent events that have not yet been included in the time series; unusual events that 
have occurred in the past, but not expected to occur again in the future; or unusual events that have 
not yet occurred, but expected to occur in the future (Armstrong & Collopy, 1998; Sanders & Ritzman, 
2004). One particular important kind of information are so-called “broken leg” or “soft” cues, which 
concern impactful changes or events that cannot be captured in a formal model; e.g., a 90% probability 
of going to the movies would not hold if one has just broken a leg (Kleinmuntz, 1990). The ability to 
recognize these cues for what they are is crucial in forecasting and is what separates experts from 
novices (Goodwin & Wright, 2010). Moreover, statistical models may classify the effects of such 
broken leg cues as noise (Goodwin, 2000). Table 1 provides a comparison of the two main groups of 
methods for forecasting based on the literature review above. 
 
 Statistical methods Judgmental methods 
Advantages Consistent 
Processing power (speed, 
amount of data) 
The unexpected 
Non-quantifiable information 
Disadvantages Exogenous events Inconsistency & bias 
Limited processing power 
 




While the (dis)advantages of the two groups of methods are painted by a broad brush, it does 
highlight an important quality: the potential for synergy. The advantages and disadvantages of both 
types of methods seem to balance each other out and hold the promise for improved forecasting 
accuracy. This potential seems to be situated especially in the case of exogenous events, in predicting 
the unexpected and in predicting rare occurrences with little quantifiable historical information. This 
doctoral research has focused on forecasting a type of special events: promotions. These can be seen 
as a disturbance in a time series. In contrast to the broken leg cues mentioned above, these special 
events have a degree of predictability. However, it is not an easy task. Usually, the amount of 
promotions in the past on which we can base ourselves, is limited. Additionally, the promotion 
disturbs the time series, complicating the baseline definition on and after the promotional event. This 
specific type of time series holds the potential for improved accuracy when judgmental and statistical 
methods are combined. The judgmental component can prove especially beneficial in such situations, 
by detecting the disturbance in the time series, providing the right interpretation and processing the 
information not ‘known’ to the statistical model. Importantly, practitioners report promotions to be 
the most common reason for adapting a statistical forecast (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007). 
While research heavily values statistical methods, surveys indicate that between 40% and 50% 
of forecasting in practice involves judgment, and possibly even more (Webby & O’Connor, 1996). For 
example, Fildes and Goodwin (2007) showed that the most prevalent method to be the judgmental 
adjustment of a statistical forecast (33.1%), followed by the statistical method alone (25.0%) and 
judgment alone (24.5%). The method least used was averaging statistical and judgmental forecasts 
(17.7%). Judgmental adjustment, most often used, takes the statistical model as starting point, and 
allows for an adjustment based on judgment. Given its cost efficiency and its ease of use, it is not 
surprising that this method is common practice (Turner, 1990). The downside is biases and 
unnecessary adjustments, which are persistent and damaging to accuracy (e.g., Eroglu & Croxton, 
2010; Fildes, et al., 2009; Webby & O’Connor, 1996).  
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Figure 1 represents the conceptual model of the doctoral thesis. This model does not indicate 
direct measurements and relationships; rather, it indicates the concepts and their values in each 
study. In every study, the task consists of forecasting from time series disturbed by promotions. A 
combination of judgment and statistics is used, leading to a certain level of forecasting accuracy. In 
the different studies, we can find different levels of expertise of the forecaster. Additionally, the 
context is also defined per study, as this can range from simple to complex. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model 
 
2. Discussion of the three papers and research objectives 
 
The three papers in this doctoral dissertation will tackle the combination of judgment and 
statistical models in three ways. The first paper, entitled “Investigating the added value of integrating 
human judgement into statistical demand forecasting systems”, recognizes the problem of judgmental 
adjustment and attempts to resolve it via testing a method that integrates judgment into the model 
itself. This method can be seen as a form of forecasting support. Decision support systems are an 
important way of facilitating forecasting and heightening accuracy. Armstrong (2001c, p. 784) defines 
them as “…a set of procedures (typically computer based) that supports forecasting. It allows the 
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analyst to easily access, organize, and analyze a variety of information. It might also enable the analyst 
to incorporate judgment and monitor forecast accuracy.” Forecast support systems typically include 
a database with time series data, a number of statistical methods, and the possibility of integrating 
managerial judgments (Fildes, et al., 2006). According to Fildes et al. (2006),  future decision support 
systems should be able to distinguish when judgment is appropriate. Moreover, when human 
intervention does occur, the system should provide support in debiasing the flaws that occur in 
judgment discussed earlier. According to Larrick (2004), debiasing can be by changing the cognitive 
strategies of the decision maker or by expanding the possible cognitive strategies with external 
techniques. Examples of the first approach include counterfactual thinking or training in decision rules, 
probabilities, or biases. Forecasting support systems (or the more widely applicable “decision support 
systems”) are an example of the latter.  
Interestingly, in an experimental study concerning the use of decision support systems, 
Goodwin, Fildes, Lawrence and Nikolopoulos  (2007) found that participants ignored the “advice” of 
the system on which model to use (in the form of an “optimize” button). Only in 14.1% of the forecasts 
examined was the optimize button used, and only in 9.2% of the total examined forecasts was the 
advised method eventually chosen. Similarly, Lim and O’Connor (1995) found a tendency among 
forecasters to persist with damaging adjustments in subsequent forecasts, despite feedback that they 
were reducing accuracy. Decision makers seem to discount advice from statistical forecasts (Önkal, 
Goodwin, Thomson, Gönul, & Pollock, 2009), resist being debiased (Larrick, 2004), and statistical tools 
in the organization are distrusted and quickly fall into disuse (Zbaracki, 1998). Forecasters overvalue 
their own opinion over that of someone else and over that of a formal forecast (Harvey & Harries, 
2004; Önkal, et al., 2009).  
 
Research objective 1: to design a forecast support system that can improve on judgmentally 
adjusted forecasts, in such a way that it is beneficial for forecasting accuracy and, simultaneously, 




In our first paper, we therefore set out to investigate a method that would allow forecasters to 
input their own judgment, without harming accuracy. Judgmental forecasting is an inherently cross-
disciplinary field, including but not limited to Psychology, Operational Research, Management Science 
and Statistics, with methods ranging from fundamental experimental research to applied empirical 
research. This paper can be situated in the scientific field ‘Operations Research’, as it focusses on the 
practical application of the developed model in an empirical context of stocks and sales.  
The conceptual model of this doctoral thesis is shown in Figure 2. The task involved in the first 
paper consists of time series with special events. Specifically, this dataset consists of two types of 
periods or products: normal products or exceptional products (products with an extra). The data were 
sales data collected in an organizational context. The expertise of the forecasters was high, as they 
were professionals. The paper focusses on designing a Forecast Support Systems that optimizes the 
combination of judgment and statistical methods.  
 
Figure 2. Conceptual model – paper 1 
By integrating the judgmental component as a variable in the prediction model, we aimed to 
improve accuracy while retaining the input of the forecaster, thereby increasing their acceptance of 
the formal method. The challenge for an effective decision support system, is to design it as such that 
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it informs forecasters about which elements they should leave to the statistical model and where 
adjustments would be beneficial (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999). Based on the work of Franses & Legerstee 
(2013), we provide an automation of this decision process. 
After conducting the study in paper 1, it was deemed important to investigate these findings on 
the combination of judgment and statistics even further. While performing studies in the 
organizational context are of high practical relevance, we turn to experimental research for finding 
basic relationships between judgmental forecasting, statistics, and accuracy. Therefore, the second 
and third paper both employ an experimental design with non-professional forecasters. Time series 
are again perturbed by promotions, and are labeled as sales figures. In contrast to the more applied 
paper in Chapter 2, the papers in Chapter 3 and 4 focus on extracting the fundamental relationships 
found in judgmental forecasting. The framework used in these papers leans more closely to that of 
experimental psychology than operational research. 
 
Figure 3. Conceptual model – paper 2 and 3. 
 
In the second paper, entitled “Enhanced anchoring effects produced by the presence of 
statistical forecasts: Effects on judgmental forecasting”, we perform three experiments aimed at 
entangling the effects of judgmental adjustment when making predictions from series perturbed by 




Research objective 2: to investigate judgmental and statistical forecasting when faced with time 
series perturbed by promotions. 
 
We found evidence of the statistical forecast being detrimental to forecast accuracy 
(Experiment 1). We manipulated the presentation of the statistical forecast history (Experiment 2) and 
lowered the proportion of promotions (Experiment 3). Our findings in the paper provide a cautionary 
tale in the application of statistical forecasting in time series with disturbances. 
Subsequently, in the third paper, entitled “Forecasting from time series subject to sporadic 
pertubations: Effectiveness of different types of forecasting support”, we worked further on the effects 
of combining judgment and formal methods in forecasting normal and promotional periods. We 
compared unaided judgmental forecasting with judgment aided by different types of statistical 
forecasts. Based on the results of the previous paper, we tested whether the detrimental effect of the 
statistical forecast was due to its crude form (not distinguishing between normal and promotional 
periods – which is realistic (Fildes, et al., 2009; Trapero, Pedregal, Fildes, & Kourentzes, 2013) but not 
generally used in research designs (e.g., Goodwin & Fildes, 1999; Goodwin, Fildes, Lawrence, & 
Stephens, 2011), or perhaps due to the experimental design. The latter was unrealistic as a 
professional forecaster will normally not have to forecast the same time series with and sometimes 
without statistical forecasts. Thus, in our third paper, the research objective is as follows:  
 
Research objective 3: investigate the added value of providing a statistical forecast compared 
to unaided judgment. 
 
An additional research objective specifies RO 3 further: 
 




We compare unaided judgment, with judgment aided by a statistical forecast based on cleansed 
series as used in research, and with judgment aided by a statistical forecast based on non-cleansed 
series as used in practice. We investigate if providing a statistical forecast is beneficial and whether 
the type of statistical forecast provided matters for forecasting accuracy. We also looked into the 
proportion of promotions: does it matter whether the time series is often perturbed or only 
occasionally? Additionally, we looked into the effects of providing a near-perfect statistical forecast 
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Investigating the added value of integrating human judgement into statistical demand 
forecasting systems 
Abstract 
While academia point towards the benefits of a statistical approach, business practice 
continues to rely on judgmental approaches for demand forecasting. In the dynamic economic 
environment of today, a combination of both approaches may prove especially relevant. The 
question remains as to how this combination should occur. This study compares two different ways 
of combining statistical and judgmental forecasting, employing real-life data from an international 
publishing company that produces weekly forecasts on regular and exceptional products. Two 
methodologies that are able to include human judgment in a forecasting model are compared. In a 
restrictive judgement model, expert predictions are incorporated as restrictions on the forecasting 
model that determines the optimal number of magazines. In an integrative judgment model, this 
information is taken into account as a predictive variable in the demand forecasting process. The 
proposed models are compared on error metrics and analysed in-depth with regard to the 
properties of the adjustments (direction, size) and of the data itself (volatility). The integrative 
approach proves to have a positive effect on accuracy in all scenarios. However, in those cases 
where the restrictive approach proved to be beneficial (medium sized and big adjustments, 
downward adjustments and adjustments in case of high volatility), the integrative approach limited 
these beneficial effects. Additionally, this study includes the link with demand planning by using the 
forecasts as input for an optimization model, to determine the ideal number of SKUs per Points of 
Sale. Hence, it makes a distinction between SKU forecasts and SKU per PoS forecasts. Importantly, 
the latter enables expressing performance as a measure of profitability, which proves to be higher 
for the integrative approach than for the restrictive approach. 
 






Accurate demand forecasting is a first vital step for supply chain management (Fildes, et al., 
2006). Such forecasts have consequences for decisions within the organisation (e.g., manufacturing, 
marketing, logistics) and within the larger supply chain (e.g., suppliers, retailers). Forecasting 
however, is not an easy task and errors can have potential negative effects (e.g., Worthen, 2003). 
While the optimization of the forecasting process can yield significant advantages such as increased 
profitability and increased customer service levels (Moon, et al., 2003), empirical research remains 
fairly limited. Specifically, few studies have focussed on real company data (Sanders, 2009) and until 
recently (Fildes, et al., 2009; Franses, 2013; Franses & Legerstee, 2011; Syntetos, Kholidasari, & 
Naim, 2016; Trapero, et al., 2013), the topic of judgmental adjustments in the operational domain 
has been overlooked. While experimental research has provided a solid basis for investigating 
judgmental forecasting, organisation-based research is needed to further understand how forecasts 
are made (Franses, 2013; Sanders, 2009). Recent examples are the papers from Franses and 
Legerstee (2009, 2011, 2013), who work with data from a pharmaceutical company; Trapero, et al. 
(2013) with manufacturing company data, and Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence and Nikolopoulus (2009), 
who compare four UK-based companies on the efficacy of their judgmental adjustments. We build 
further on their work by investigating the effect of judgmental forecasting within the context of a 
publishing company. We extend their studies in four ways: first, we investigate whether the 
approach of formally including expert knowledge as an additional explanatory variable as proposed 
by Franses and Legerstee (2011), although unsuccessful in the pharmacy industry, is more successful 
in an industry which handles both normal and exceptional products. Incorporating the expectations 
of experts has the possibility of improving the predictive performance of these models significantly, 
especially in the case of promotions (Fildes, Goodwin, & Onkal, 2016; Goodwin, 2002; Goodwin & 
Fildes, 1999; Trapero, et al., 2013). This is because the knowledge of expert forecasters represents a 
previously unmodelled component (Lawrence, et al., 2006). Although forecasting models are 
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generally superior to human judgement based on the same information, experts can still add value 
because they are better able to recognize when predictions should be adapted based on additional 
information or the existence of exceptional events (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999; Jones & Brown, 2002). 
A study by Sinha and Zhao (2008) in the field of datamining demonstrated the added value of expert 
knowledge on a wide set of classifiers. The current study explicitly compares two different 
approaches: a restrictive approach and an integrative approach. In the former, predictions are 
restrictions of the demand forecasting model: i.e., the traditional case of judgmental adjustment of a 
statistical forecast. In the integrative approach, this information is taken into account as a predictive 
variable in the demand forecasting model itself. The advantage of this approach is two-fold: the 
forecasters retain their input and feeling of ownership, while the damaging effects of unnecessary 
adjustments are mitigated. In addition, this method should motivate forecasters to make the correct 
adjustment. The more accurate the adjustments of the forecaster were in the past, the more likely 
this variable will be picked up as a significant predictor for future demand. 
Second, we integrate the papers of Fildes et al. (Fildes, et al., 2006) and Franses and 
Legerstee (2011), by providing an in-depth analysis of size and direction of adjustments, and 
volatility of the data. Regarding the latter, human judgment has been said to be especially relevant 
in the context of high volatility products due to special events such as promotions (Sanders & 
Ritzman, 1992). Our dataset gives a unique insight into volatility defined in two ways: as the 
variation in the data series (Sanders & Ritzman, 1992), and volatility defined as exceptional products. 
Third, this study distinguishes between two levels of granularity in the forecasting process: 
SKU and SKU per PoS. Kremer, Siemsen, and Thomas (2015) have pointed out that judgmental 
forecasting research has not yet studied the effects on hierarchical forecasting. The accuracy of 
judgmental forecasts on the top-level and the bottom-level are generally not the same (Kremer, 
Siemsen, & Thomas, 2015). The integration of human judgement in forecasting models on SKU per 
PoS level may create an additional advantage, in that the algorithm can determine in which PoS the 
factors taken into account by the expert are most influential. 
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Fourth, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that includes data on both sales 
numbers and profit margins. Steenburgh et al. (2003) already showed that even small improvements 
in predictive performance can have a serious impact on a firms profitability. In order to investigate 
both aspects, this study makes a distinction between the forecasting system and the optimization 
system, as recommended in previous research (Fildes, et al., 2009). The forecasting system aims to 
predict the demand of a product, whereas the goal of the optimization model is to maximize profit, 
taking price, production cost, delivery cost, recollection cost and expected revenue into account. 
Whereas the forecasting system enables expressions of accuracy with measures such as MAPE or 
MdAPE, the optimization model indicates the results via a profitability metric. 
 
2. Background Literature 
 
The potential for accurate demand forecasting has only increased because of the 
exponential increase in computational power, the rise of the internet and the decrease in data 
warehousing costs. However, due to accelerated product lifecycles and unpredictable customer 
demand, forecasting remains challenging (Merzifonluoglu, 2015). Data analytics and human 
judgment need to be combined to achieve better results, rather than being seen as a dichotomy 
(Ransbotham, Kiron, & Prentice, 2016). However, it has proven to be a significant challenge to 
successfully combine the analytical power of computers with human judgment of organisational 
forecasters. Forecasters usually have a choice between leaving the prediction of the statistical model 
as it is, or adjusting it in a number of ways. Judgmental adjustment takes the statistical model as 
starting point, and allows for an adjustment based on human judgment. Given its cost efficiency and 
it being easy-to-use, it is not surprising that this method is common practice (Turner, 1990). The 
downside is the possibility of biases and unnecessary adjustments (Eroglu & Croxton, 2010; Webby 
& O’Connor, 1996). The latter is hypothesized to be caused by the illusion of control effect, where 
people have increased confidence in forecasts they have adjusted (Kotteman, et al., 1994), and the 
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tendency of humans to see patterns in noise (Fildes, et al., 2009). On the other hand, forecasting 
models have difficulties incorporating the effect of exceptional events such as promotions or new 
product launches (Goodwin, 2002; Goodwin & Fildes, 1999; Scarpel, 2015). As a result, expert 
judgment is complementary with the process of mechanically analysing large amounts of data 
(Alvarado-Valencia, Barrero, Önkal, & Dennerlein, 2016; Blattberg & Hoch, 1990; Goodwin, 2002; 
Goodwin, et al., 2011). The question remains how to optimally integrate expert judgment with 
forecasting models. Recently, Alvarado-Valencia, Barrero, Önkal and Dennerlein (2016) compared 
three integration methods: judgmental adjustment, 50/50 combination and divide-and-conquer 
(restricting information access). Judgmental adjustment performed best, possibly because the other 
techniques restricted access to information. They conclude that bias reduction through information 
restriction does not work. Other research with decision support systems has illustrated that pointing 
the forecasters towards the damaging effect (in terms of forecasting accuracy) of their adjustments 
is not the solution. The tendency to adjust persists despite warning (Lim & O'Connor, 1995). This 
tendency to discount advice is especially troublesome, given that it implies that conscious efforts 
toward de-biasing judgmental adjustments may be in vain. Goodwin, Fildes, Lawrence and Stephens 
(2011) focussed on two possibilities to counter harmful judgmental adjustments: restrictiveness 
(limiting options) and guidance (providing information and explanation). Similar to previous studies 
in advice taking (e.g., Lim & O'Connor, 1995), the provision of guidance had no significant effect. 
Restricting users options to make adjustments to the forecast even led to a significant reduction in 
forecasting accuracy. An additional problem poses itself in the case of restricting judgmental 
adjustment: the acceptability of the system in the eyes of the forecaster (Goodwin, et al., 2011). 
Reducing harmful adjustments can come at the price of reduced acceptance (Goodwin, et al., 2011), 
feelings of loss of control and ownership (Goodwin, 2002) and decreased trust of the final forecast 
(Önkal, et al., 2009). 
While some researchers work on de-biasing the judgmental component, others focus on 
improving predictive performance by applying more advanced statistical techniques (e.g., 
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Kourentzes & Petropoulos, 2015). However, surveys have indicated that judgment persists in 
business forecasting (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007) and simultaneously, that forecasting accuracy in 
business practice is not improving (Armstrong, Green, & Graefe, 2013). We therefore propose to re-
visit the possibility of incorporating human judgment factors in the model itself in order to improve 
the accuracy of predictions (Franses & Legerstee, 2011). This way of working has the benefit of 
potentially mitigating the harmful effects of judgment in two ways: first, by discounting those 
judgments that are biased or with great error, based on the historic performance. Second, it takes 
the widespread practice of incorporating judgment in forecasting into account. Forecasters will still 
be able to submit their judgment and show that they are attending to the task (Fildes, et al., 2009). 
Importantly, forecasters will not be put off by the system (Silver, 1991) and retain their sense of 
ownership. The model will incorporate human judgment as a predictor if these adjustments have 
proved to add value in the past. In sum, while previous attempts at optimizing the judgment-
statistics combination via a forecast support system have demonstrated potential damaging effects 
on forecaster performance and forecasting accuracy, the integrative model collects input from both 
sources, and should therefore mitigate potential harmful effects of human judgment, while 
recognizing the role of acceptance of the forecaster/user. In the dataset of Franses and Legerstee 
(2011), the judgmental component proved only beneficial if the statistical model was not performing 
well. Overall, the original statistical model does not seem to improve by including judgment. 
However, ignoring the value of expert judgment can be especially dangerous in time series with 
disturbances, such as promotions and other exceptional events. We therefore propose an 
integrative approach that can be of significant value for industries dealing with exceptional events, 





3. Integrative judgment forecasting model 
 
In order to gain a more in-depth understanding of the effects of integrative judgment versus 
restrictive judgment, we investigate adjustment sizes, direction of the adjustment and the volatility 
of the data series. Previous research has shown that downward adjustments are more likely to be 
beneficial than upward adjustments (Fildes, et al., 2009; Franses & Legerstee, 2009; Syntetos, 
Nikolopoulos, Boylan, Fildes, & Goodwin, 2009). A possible explanation here is that downward 
adjustments are only made in the presence of evidence that a downturn may arise, while upward 
adjustments are mostly a reflection of over-optimism and wishful thinking of the forecaster (Fildes, 
et al., 2009). An integrative approach should counter the negative effects of positive adjustments as 
follows: In the integrative model, the historical human judgment forecast is added as an additional 
predictive variable. The model determines whether or not to take this variable into account based 
on past performance. Only if adjustments have been historically sufficiently accurate and have 
added value, the model will take them into account. Goodwin et al. (2011) state that a forecast 
support system which integrates judgment and statistics, should support two stages of this task: 
first, the decision whether or not the adjustment adds value and second, the determination of how 
large the adjustment should be. The integrative approach takes this into account, by looking at the 
significance and weight of the human judgment predictor. 
In addition to the direction of the adjustment, previous research suggests a relationship 
between the size of the adjustment and forecasting accuracy, such that mostly big adjustments are 
beneficial and small adjustments should be avoided as to not harm forecasting accuracy (Fildes, et 
al., 2009; Syntetos, et al., 2009). This can be explained by the tinkering with data effect, where 
forecasters make small adjustments to show that they are working on the task and feel responsible 
and in control of the forecasting process (Fildes, et al., 2009). Large adjustments on the other hand, 
are an indicator of knowledge available to the forecaster that is not yet incorporated in the system. 
However, Fildes et al. (2009) find a tipping point in the case of negative adjustments, such that very 
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large adjustments are equally damaging for forecasting accuracy. Indeed, the effect of adjustment 
size on forecasting accuracy is curvilinear (inverted U-shape), such that both small and very large 
adjustments are damaging for forecasting accuracy. Similarly, Trapero et al. (2013) found adjusted 
forecasts of promotional periods to be potentially beneficial, but not when they were overly large. In 
other words, the integrative approach should mitigate the damaging effects of both too small and 
too large adjustments.  
A third factor that may play a role in forecast accuracy is volatility. Forecasting models 
typically have problems dealing with exceptional events (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999). These exceptional 
events can occur in several ways, for example the occurrence of the Olympic games when predicting 
aviation traffic in a country or predicting the sales of a special issue of a magazine. Since little past 
information about these events is available, it is difficult for computerized models to take this effect 
into account. Especially in these situations, the incorporation of human judgement can add 
significant value and could enhance the accuracy of the models (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999). In other 
words, expert judgment can prove beneficial in volatile data series. However, a distinction must be 
made between volatile data series because of special events or because of noise. In the former case, 
human judgment is expected to outperform models (Sanders & Ritzman, 1992) while in the latter 
case, models outperform judgment (O’Connor, et al., 1993). In this study, volatility is determined by 
the presence of promotions. In concordance with previous literature, we therefore expect that 
human judgment will have added value over the statistical model if promotions are present (high 
volatility). In contrast, in low volatility series (periods without promotions), judgment is expected to 
damage forecasting accuracy (Sanders & Ritzman, 1992). The damaging effect of judgment in low 
volatility series should be mitigated by the integrative approach, compared to the restrictive 
approach. 
In addition to the above mentioned qualities of the data, this study decomposes forecasting 
models on different levels of granularity. Kremer et al. (2015) indicated the lack of cross-over 
between judgmental forecasting and hierarchical forecasting research. Yet, in many business 
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situations, the forecasted SKUs are distributed over multiple points of sales (PoS). Hence, an 
organization has the choice between generating forecasts on SKU level and rolling this down to SKU 
per PoS level by using business rules, or making the forecasts on PoS level directly per SKU. For 
statistical forecasts, both options are easily implemented. However, in the latter situation, 
integrating human judgement is challenging since the number of SKU and PoS combinations is 
typically very high. This makes it impossible to apply expert adjustments on the lowest level of 
granularity. As an alternative, in a traditional restrictive approach, the forecasts on SKU per PoS level 
could be rolled up again on SKU level, which allows adjustments based on human judgement 
expertise. Next, these corrections would be applied over all PoS equally. However, this equal 
correction over all PoS is not always optimal. For example, if the expert systematically takes weather 
into account to make adjustments to the statistical forecast, an equal division would not incorporate 
geographical location effects per PoS: the influence of weather might be greater in PoS in touristic 
and commercial areas than in other rural areas. Thus, a trade-off exists between level of detail 
(granularity) and potential error (Zotteri & Kalchschmidt, 2007). In this situation, the use of an 
integrative judgement model adds value, in that not all PoS will be treated equally. Since expert 
adjustments are taken into account as an explanatory variable in the forecasting models on SKU per 
PoS level, it is able to distinguish the PoS that are typically more influenced by the expert related 
factors than others. 
While accuracy is an important indicator of forecasting performance, this indicator remains 
in the theoretical realm. Several researchers highlight the need to link forecast accuracy to measures 
linked to other business performance (Kerkkänen, Korpela, & Huiskonen, 2009; Mahmoud, DeRoeck, 
Brown, & Rice, 1992; Mentzer, Bienstock, & Kahn, 1999; Moon, et al., 2003). Previous studies have 
indicated links between improved demand forecasting accuracy and inventory management (e.g., 
Clarke, 2006; Oliva & Watson, 2009; Syntetos, Nikolopoulos, & Boylan, 2010) and delivery times 
(Shan et al., 2009). This study focusses specifically on the practical consequences of demand 
forecasting accuracy on financial results. By doing this, we are able to express the effect of increased 
31 
 
forecasting accuracy on the profitability of the organisation. The forecasts are used as an input for 
an optimization algorithm that determines the ideal number of SKUs per point of sales, taking 
revenue and costs into account. Hence, the focus of this optimization algorithm is to maximize 
profitability and not accuracy. Although the optimization algorithm on itself is out of the scope of 
this research, this enables us to express the results of this study in a more business relevant profit 
metric. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that takes this effect into account. 
In sum, this study looks at the potential beneficial effects of integrating expert judgment in 
the statistical forecasting model. In contrast to Franses en Legerstee (2011), our time series are 
disturbed by exceptional events (promotions), which should increase the potential for an added 
value of judgmental intervention. We analyse our dataset in-depth according to the paper of Fildes 
et al. (2009) to provide a basis for comparison of the datasets characteristics. Additionally, we follow 
Kremer et al. ‘s (2015) recommendation to distinguish between the different hierarchical levels of 
forecasting. Lastly, we believe this to be the first study that links changes in forecast accuracy to a 
measure of direct profitability. 
 
4. Materials and Methods 
4.1. Data 
Data from a European publishing company were collected. The company distributes weekly 
and monthly magazines to 5902 points of sales. The data included statistical system demand 
forecasts, judgemental forecasting adjustments, optimization recommendations for maximizing 
profit and corresponding actual outcomes. The products are divided into two categories: regular 
products and exceptional products. An exceptional product is defined as a regular product with an 
extra: a magazine that includes another magazine, a collectible, dvd, cd, etcetera. In total 3 575 263 
data points were collected over a time period of 16 months. These data points contain forecasting 
data on SKU and PoS level. This data can be rolled up to 1312 aggregated forecasts on SKU levels. 
Data cleaning led to the deletion of cases with missing information, magazines with less than 100 
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sales (in comparison, mean sales per SKU = 30 604) (Fildes, et al., 2009), and two cases in which the 
system forecast deviated extremely from the final sales (APE larger than 2000%), resulting in a final 
of 1223 aggregated forecasts. Out of those 1223, 850 were classified as regular products (69.50%) 
and 373 as exceptional products (30.50%) by the company. The forecasting process was discussed 




Figure 1 shows the original forecasting process of the company. This process takes place on 
two levels of granularity: SKU per Point of Sales (PoS) and SKU level (the aggregated demand 
forecast per magazine). 
 
Figure 1. Restrictive Judgment Process 
In a first step, the demand per PoS is estimated using a statistical forecasting support 
system. This forecast is denoted as |,, which represents the statistical forecast for Point of 
Sales p for time t+1 at origin t. This forecast is generated by several time series based forecasting 
techniques such as moving average, exponential smoothing or ARIMA models. Each of these 
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techniques is based on lagged sales data. We will illustrate this using an autoregressive model of 
order two, similar to the one used in Franses and Legerstee  (2011) : 
	, =	,	, +	,	, + ,	       (1) 
 
Where 	, represents the Demand at time t at Point of Sales p and  	is an unobserved 
error term. Based on this forecasting support system the statistical model-based forecast for each 
PoS can be obtained by: 
|, =	,	, +	,	,        (2) 
 
Since the number of PoS is typically very large (i.e., 5902) it is impossible to evaluate each 
forecast using expert judgment. Therefore, in a second step, this data is rolled up to a higher level 
using the following equation: 
| =	∑ |,

          (3) 
 
Where n represents the total number of PoS. In a third step, this aggregated forecast is sent 
to an expert, who can adjust the forecast. This judgement-based expert forecast can be denoted as 
|, which represents the expert forecast on an aggregated SKU level for time t+1 at origin t. 
This expert forecast can be formulated by the following equation (Franses & Legerstee, 2011) : 
| 	= 	| +		|        (4) 
 
This assumes that the judgement-based expert forecast can be decomposed into a weighted 
average of the statistically-based model forecast and own expert knowledge. This weight is 
represented by λ, which can range between 0, when the expert ignores the model forecast, and 1, 
when the expert completely accepts the model forecast. It is important to mention that in practice, a 
company often does not know how much the expert relies on the model forecast. In addition, 
equally frequently unknown are the factors that are taken into consideration by the expert to adjust 
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the forecast, represented by |in equation (4) (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007). In a fourth step, these 
adjusted forecasts are drilled down again over all PoS equally as followed: 









This forecast on PoS level can be passed on to planning and used as input for an optimization 
model that maximises the expected profit. This process is further referred to as restrictive judgment, 
since the judgmental adjustment of the forecaster serves as a restriction on the model output (see 
Figure 1). 
In the integrative model (Figure 2) the beginning of the process is the same as currently used 
in the company and has been described above: forecasting support systems based on past sales 
provide a statistically-based forecast in each PoS. This is aggregated to SKU level and presented to 
the expert for evaluation and adjustment. 
 
Figure 2. Integrative Judgment Process 
However, in contrast with the previous method, the adjusted forecast is not directly drilled 
down to PoS level afterwards. Rather, the judgment-based expert adjustments now serve as a 
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predictor variable for the statistically-based forecasting model on PoS level, which can be formulated 
as (Franses & Legerstee, 2011) : 
 
	, =	,	, +	,	, + 	| + ,	      (6) 
 
Based on equation (4) this can be rewritten as 
 
	, =	,	, +	,	, + | − | + ,    (7) 
 
Defining  =	, + ,	 and  = 	,, equation (7) can be rewritten as 
 
	, =	,	, +	,	, + ,| +	,| − | + ,  (8) 
 
Equation (8) shows that this statistically-based forecasting model includes the judgement-
based expert forecast on SKU level. The more systematically accurate the expert forecast |was 
in the past, the higher the relevance of this variable will be in the forecasting support system. The 
model allows parameters , and ,to vary depending on the PoS. By this the forecasting support 
system can distinguish between PoS that are systematically more or less influenced by the 
unobserved factors taken into account by the expert. Based on this forecasting support system, the 
judgment integrated model-based forecast |,on PoS level can be expressed as: 
|, =	,	, +	,	, + ,| +	,| − |   (9) 
 
This process is termed integrative judgment (see Figure 2), since the judgment-based expert 
adjustment is integrated in the forecast equation. Note that in a situation in which no aggregated 
model forecast is proved (i.e. step 1 until 3 is skipped in the forecasting process), as a result of a lack 
of time or standardized forecasting process, or when the expert totally ignores this input, a 
judgment integrated model-based forecast can still be generated. In this specific situation the weight 
= 0, which reduces equation (9) to: 
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|, =	,	, +	,	, + ,|      (10) 
 
Finally, in fifth step, these final integrative forecasts on PoS level could still be rolled up to SKU 




          (11) 
 
Although the forecast on PoS level expressed in equation (10) will be used for planning, this 
aggregated forecast is still interesting for comparing the integrative approach with the traditional 
restrictive approach defined in equation (4). 
Since the goal of the forecasting models is to maximize prediction accuracy, this comparison 
can be expressed in metrics such as Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) and Median Absolute 
Percentage Error (MdAPE). However, the forecasting evaluation in business practice goes beyond 
accuracy, as it serves as a starting point for planning (Kremer, et al., 2015; Mahmoud, et al., 1992; 
Mentzer, et al., 1999; Moon, et al., 2003). In order to plan the optimal number of units in each PoS, 
an optimization model is used with the forecasted demand on PoS level as input (see right-hand side 
on Figures 1 and 2). This algorithm has the goal to maximize profitability taking potential costs into 
account. More specifically, profitability can be expressed by the following equation: 
 , = ! ∗ #, −  ∗	$, − % ∗ $, −	#,       (12) 
With  , being the operational profit at time t in PoS p (excluding all overhead and fixed 
costs), R being the revenue earned from selling one magazine, #,	being the number of magazines 
sold at time t in PoS p, I the cost to put a magazine in the market (printing + distribution cost), $, 
the number of magazines distributed to PoS p at time t and O being the cost to get an unsold 
magazine out of the market. 
The outcome of the optimization model is the optimal quantity $,	to be delivered at time t 
per PoS p, that maximises the expected profit taking the expected demand of the forecasting model, 
the inventory cost and opportunity cost into account. This can be aggregated to give the total 
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number of units to be produced. The focus of this study is on the forecasting process by comparing a 
restrictive judgment and integrative judgment approach; however, the effect on the planning 
process will be discussed as well, by expressing the results in a profitability metric. 
  
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Judgemental Adjustment, defined as JA, can be measured as followed:  
For a restrictive approach: 
 
&' = 100 ∗	
)*+,-|+	.*+,-|+		
.*+,-|+
         (13) 
 
For an integrative approach: 
 
&' = 100 ∗	
/*+,-|+	.*+,-|+		
.*+,-|+
         (14) 
 
 
Table 1 indicates the relative adjustment sizes for the restrictive and integrative judgment 
model respectively, with the number of adjustments distributed evenly over four quantiles. The 
adjustment sizes of the integrative model are noticeably smaller than those of the restrictive model, 
which shows that the integrative approach is more careful in adapting based on judgemental 





 Restrictive Judgment Integrative judgment 
25% Quantile 4.93% 0.00% 
Mean 24.51% 4.74% 
Median 11.94% .67% 
75% Quantile 31.01% 3.97% 
 
Table 1. Quartiles, Mean and Median of percentage adjustments. N = 1223 
 
The data was checked against outliers above 250%, similar to Fildes, et al. (2009). No cases 
needed to be deleted: the largest adjustment made in both the restrictive and the integrative model 
was 149,55%. Table 2 shows the mean and median sizes of the relative adjustments according to the 




Restrictive judgment Integrative judgment 
N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Downward 587 (48%) -17.70% -12.31% 464 (37.94%) -5.71% -1.93% 
No adjustment 28 (2.29%) - - 375 (30.66%) - - 
Upward 608 (49.71%) 31.57% 12.12% 384 (31.40%) 8.21% 2.48% 
 
Table 2: Mean and median of adjustments, ordered by direction of adjustment 
 
As the table indicates, for the restrictive judgment model, adjustments were made in 1195 
or 97.71% of the cases, of which 587 or 48,00% were downward (Mean adjustment size = -17.70%, 
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Median adjustment size = -12.31%) and 49.71% upward (Mean adjustment size = 31.57%, Median 
adjustment size = 12.12%). Comparatively, in an integrative judgment model, the prediction of the 
basic model was deemed already optimal in 375 or 30.66% of the cases, resulting in 464 or 37.94% 
downward adjustments (Mean adjustment size = -5.71%, Median adjustment size = -1.93%) and 384 
or 31.40% upward adjustments (Mean adjustment size = 8.21%, Median adjustment size = 2.48%) . 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the distribution of the adjustment sizes (percentages expressed 
as decimals) for the restrictive model and the integrative model respectively. The histograms show a 
clear difference between the integrative and restrictive approach. The adjustments within the 
restrictive approach are clearly more frequent and larger than in the integrative approach. In 
addition, the restrictive approach is somewhat skewed towards positive adjustment, which cannot 









Figure 4. Distribution of adjustments in the integrative model 
5.2. Performance  
5.2.1. Error metrics 
Table 3 indicates the relative performance of the models. Performance is measured as the 
forecasted demand, compared to the actual sales. The results of MAPE and MdAPE differ such that 
the median scores are lower than the mean scores, indicating that the data is skewed to the right 
(similar to Fildes et al., 2009). We therefore report both MAPE and MdAPE as measures of 
forecasting accuracy. To compare the performance of the restrictive model and the integrative 
model with the basic statistical model, we use FCIMP (forecast improvement) according to the 
formula:  
For a restrictive approach, FCIMP will be defined as: 
 
0 = 100 ∗
|1+,-	.*+,-|+||1+,-	)*+,-|+|	
1+,-
       (15) 
 




0 = 100 ∗
|1+,-	.*+,-|+||1+,-	/*+,-|+|	
1+,-
       (16) 
 
This indicates the difference between the APE from the system forecast and the APE of the 
adjusted forecast (Fildes, et al., 2009), based on a restrictive or on an integrative approach. For those 
comparisons where the observations were correlated (general comparison, volatility and frequency), 
we used a bootstrapped paired t-test with 1000 samples for comparing the MAPE, FCIMP and profit. 
In order to compare the MdAPE, we compared the medians with a Wilcoxon signed rank test. For 
those comparisons where the observations were partially correlated (direction and size of 
adjustments), we used a bootstrapped weighed t-test (with 1000 samples) as proposed by Samawi 
and Vogel (2014). Using a similar method, aWilcoxon Rank Sum Test is combined with a Wilcoxin 
Signed Rank Test to compare the MdAPEs of partially correlated samples. In general, integrative 
judgment outperforms restrictive judgment and the basic statistical model in terms of the mean and 
median absolute percentage error (Table 3).  
 








MAPE 25.03% 26.18%BSM: n.s. 21.88% BSM: ***/RM: ** 
MdAPE 9.95% 10.83% BSM: n.s. 8.24% BSM: *** /RM: *** 
FCIMP - -1.15% 3.15% RM: ** 
Note. Proposed models are compared with the basic statistical model (BSM) and each 
other (RM). 
Note. Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n.s. not significant 
 




Paired t-tests indicate that the integrative model (MAPE = 21.88%) outperforms the basic 
statistical model (MAPE = 25.03%; t (1222) = 8.870, p < .001), and the restrictive model (MAPE = 
26.18%; t (1222) = 2.97, p = .003). The difference between the restrictive judgment model and the 
basic model does not appear to be significant (t (1222) = -.76, p = .445). To compare the MdAPE 
scores, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was used. Similar to the MAPE scores, the integrative model 
(MdAPE = 8.24%) outperforms the basic statistical model (MdAPE = 9.95%; z = 9.18, p < .001), and 
the restrictive model (MdAPE = 10.83%; z = 5.78, p < .001). The difference between the restrictive 
judgment model and the basic model is again not significant (z = -1.12, p = .261). 
Digging deeper into the data, we compare both models with regard to the direction of the 
adjustments, their size, and the volatility of the data. 
 
 
Restrictive judgment Integrative judgment 










































Note. Integrative judgment model is compared with the restrictive judgment model. 
Note. Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n.s. not significant 
 
Table 4. MAPE, MdAPE , and FCIMP, ordered by direction of adjustment. 
  
With regard to the direction of the adjustments (Table 4), our dataset confirms previous 
literature, which indicates upward adjustments as damaging to forecasting accuracy (FCIMP = -
19.91%, compared to the basic model), while downward adjustments are beneficial (FCIMP = 
+18.24%, compared to the basic model) in a traditional restrictive approach. However, when 
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judgment is included in an integrative way, both upward (FCIMP = +1.97%) and downward (FCIMP = 
+5.01%) adjustments are beneficial.    
The integrative approach thus mitigates the severely damaging effects of restrictive 
judgmental adjustment. However, while the damaging effect of upward adjustments is neutralized 
and even translated into a small beneficial effect, the beneficial effects of downward adjustments 
are tempered (from 18.24% improved accuracy with restrictive judgment, to 5.01% improved 
accuracy in the case of integrative judgment). These results show that, on average, the integrative 
approach is able to ignore the adjustments that are consistently over-optimistic and mainly 
incorporates only useful positive adjustments. 
 
Adjustment size Restrictive judgment Integrative judgment 
N MAPE MdAPE FCIMP N MAPE MdAPE FCIMP 
No adjustment 28 53.85% 
 
32.76% - 375 19.97% 6.51% - 








Q2 298 13.66% 8.49% -1.47% 
 
212 18.11%*** 7.62%n.s. 0.44%n.s. 
 




212 21.25%n.s. 8.63%* 1.57%*** 
 










Note. Integrative judgment model is compared with the restrictive judgment model. 
Note. 1 the value was marginally significant at .051. 
Note. Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n.s. not significant 
 
Table 5. Adjustments ordered by size in four quantiles: MAPE, MdAPE,  and FCIMP 
 
With regard to adjustment size for the restrictive model (Table 5), we find a curvilinear 
relationship similar to Fildes et al. (2009) between adjustment size (expressed in four quantiles) and 
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forecasting accuracy, such that small adjustments (Q1= -0.3% and Q2= -1.47%) and overly large 
adjustments (Q4= -8.89%) are damaging. Only medium adjustments proved to be beneficial (Q3 = 
5.99%). However, when judgment is included in an integrative way, the damaging effects of Q1, Q2 
and Q4 are translated into a beneficial effect, showing a concave function with Q1 = 0.06%, Q2 = 
0.44%, Q3 = 1.57% and Q4 = 16.11%. 
While adjustments are always beneficial in the case of integrative judgment, the large 
beneficial effect of Q3 with restrictive judgment is limited (a decline in beneficial effect from 5.99% 
to 1.57% ). However, the severely damaging effect of overly large adjustments (-8.89% ) is translated 
in a highly beneficial effect (16.11% ). To calculate volatility, we employ two different procedures. 
First, we calculate volatility as the coefficient of variation of the system forecast absolute error 
(Fildes, et al., 2009). The resulting volatility scores are divided into four quantiles, ranging from low 
to high (Table 6). 
 
Volatility (SD) Restrictive judgment Integrative judgment 
N MAPE MdAPE FCIMP N MAPE MdAPE FCIMP 
SD Q1 305 54.25% 31.91% -28.84% 305 24.81%*** 12.95%*** 0.60%*** 
SD Q2 306 26.20% 14.68% 6.40% 306 28.95%n.s. 15.46% n.s. 3.66% n.s. 
SD Q3 306 13.16% 7.53% 10.87% 306 18.27% n.s. 6.42% n.s. 5.76% n.s. 
SD Q4 306 11.19% 7.31% 6.89% 306 15.51%*** 4.90%*** 2.57% n.s. 
Note. Integrative judgment model is compared with the restrictive judgment model. 
Note. Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n.s. not significant 
 
Table 6: Performance ordered by volatility according to SD: MAPE, MdAPE, and FCIMP 
 
In the case of restrictive judgment, judgmental adjustments are especially troublesome in 
the lowest quantile, with a reduction of -28.84% in forecasting accuracy. The other quantiles with 
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medium to high volatility on the other hand, show a forecasting improvement of 6.40% (Q2), 10.87% 
(Q3) and 6.89% (Q4). In the integrative model, there is a slight forecasting improvement in all 
quantiles and ranges of volatility, displaying a curvilinear effect with Q1 = .6%, Q2 = 3.66%, Q3 = 
5.76% and Q4 = 2.57%. The change in FCIMP from the restrictive model to the integrative model is 
significant for Quartile 1 (t (304) = -8.82, p < .001), marginally significant for Quartile 3 (t (305) = 
1.91, p = .056), but not significant for Quartile 2 (t (305) = 1.30, p = .196) or Quartile 4 (t (305) = 1.54, 
p = .126). Second, we follow the company’s categorization in regular products (considered easy to 
predict) and exceptional products (considered difficult to predict) as an analogy for low and high 
volatility (Table 7). The correlation with the previous metric equals r = 0.3468, suggesting a 
relationship but not a full overlap. For instance, within the low volatility category, there is still an 




Restrictive judgment Integrative judgment 




























Note. Integrative judgment model is compared with the restrictive judgment model. 
Note. Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n.s. not significant 
 
Table 7. Performance ordered by volatility according to category: MAPE, MdAPE,  and FCIMP  
 
The results of the restrictive model confirm that judgmental adjustment in case of low 
volatility (regular products) is damaging (FCIMP = -12.36%) and is beneficial in the case of high 
volatility (FCIMP = 24.42%). In the integrative model, the damaging effect of judgment in case of low 
volatility is eliminated and translated into a positive, albeit small improvement in forecasting 
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accuracy (FCIMP = 2.90%; t (372) = 6.10, p < .001). In case of high volatility, the forecast 
improvement is 3.72% (t (849) = -11.91, p < .001). Logically, for non-volatile products, the statistical 
method is quite adept at predicting demand. Judgmental adjustment will on average be more 
harmful (e.g., due to tinkering with the data) than beneficial (e.g., due to having additional 
information). The parameter of the judgmental component will consequently be low to zero in the 
case of non-volatile products. However, in situations with high volatility, expert adjustment is 
beneficial. However, the integrative approach limits the effect. 
In sum, the integrative model consistently outperforms the basic statistical model. However, 
in those cases where the restrictive model has a beneficial effect compared to the basic model, this 
improvement is larger than with the integrative model. 
 
5.2.2. Profitability 
The output of the prediction model serves as input for an optimization model, which 
calculates the optimal number of magazines for each PoS. The optimization enables an expression of 
model performance in profatibility. To guarantee anonymity of the company and protect 
confidential data, we report the measure of profit expressed as a percentage of the hypothetical 
maximum profit. The hypothetical maximum profit is reached if every PoS would sell the exact 
amount of predicted magazines. In this situation, no product would have to be returned or none 
would have to be delivered additionally, maximizing profit. The results of the optimization model for 
restrictive judgment and integrative judgment respectively, are compared to this perfect situation. 
The result is a percentage which indicates how close the optimization model comes to the ideal 
situation. This amounts to a profit percentage of 82,00% for the basic statistical model (see Table 8). 
This implies that there is still a potential to improve profitability with 18% if the forecast in each PoS 












MAPE 25.03% 26.18% BSM: n.s. 22.54% BSM: ***/RM: ** 
MdAPE 9.95% 10.83% BSM: n.s. 8.24% BSM: ***/RM: *** 
FCIMP - -1.15%  2.49% RM: ** 
Profit 82.00% 77.17% BSM: *** 82.80% BSM: ***/RM: *** 
Note. Integrative judgment model is compared with the restrictive judgment model. 
Note. Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n.s. not significant 
 
Table 8: Model performance expressed as MAPE, MdAPE, FCIMP and profit (%) 
 
The restrictive model demonstrates a damaging effect on profit, reducing the profit 
percentage to 77,17% (a decline of 4.83% compared to the statistical model; t (1222) = 6.91, p < 
.001). The integrative model however, displays a positive effect on profit compared to the statistical 
model (an improvement of .80%), with a profit percentage of 82.80% (t (1222) = -9.58, p < .001). This 




6.1. Summary of findings 
This study builds further on previous judgmental forecasting research, which indicates that 
restrictive human judgment proves to be valuable only in specific cases. The method of 
incorporating human judgement predictions in an integrative way suggests a way to counter the 
harmful effects of upward adjustments, small or overly large adjustments and adjustments made in 
the case of low volatility. Previous research has extensively proven that people have a tendency to 
adjust forecasts, even if they have no additional information (Lawrence, et al., 2006). Forecasters 
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tend to have increased confidence in forecasts they have adjusted (Kotteman, et al., 1994) and 
tinker unnecessarily with the outcomes of the statistical model, simply to show they are paying 
attention to the task (Fildes, et al., 2009). These unnecessary adjustments lead to a general decline 
in forecasting accuracy. The integrative approach counters the harmful effects of these adjustments. 
Indeed, the methodology has a positive effect on accuracy in all scenarios. However, in those cases 
where the restrictive approach proved to be beneficial (medium sized and big adjustments, 
downward adjustments and adjustments in case of high volatility), the integrative approach limited 
these beneficial effects. 
 
6.2. Managerial contributions 
The integrative approach can prove beneficial for business practice on four different aspects: 
accuracy, process, profit and people management. First, the integrative approach has proven to be 
able to counter any damaging effects that existed in the forecasts because of judgmental factors. 
While the traditional restrictive approach demonstrated the same pitfalls (damaging small 
adjustments, positive adjustments) as found in previous literature (e.g., Fildes et al., 2009), the 
integrative approach cancelled out all effects that were detrimental for forecasting accuracy. Classic 
forecast accuracy metrics such as MAPE and MdAPE show a reduction in error rates and thus an 
improvement in general forecasting accuracy. 
Second, the integrative approach can lead to process improvement. The model enables a 
tailored drill-down of judgmental adjustment to the different PoS. Manual adjustment per PoS 
would require a labour intensive way of adjusting forecasts. Using business rules may not always 
prove accurate. By using the integrative approach, the model parameters automatically indicate the 
importance of judgmental adjustment for each PoS separately. 
Third, this dataset provided the opportunity to look beyond established theoretical 
measures of accuracy and provided a picture of profitability by distinguishing between the 
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forecasting system and the optimization system. The integrative approach thus has an even more 
tangible positive consequence, in that it heightens not only accuracy measures but also heightens 
profit. While the classic, restrictive approach damaged profit compared to the basic statistical 
forecasting model, the integrative approach not only mitigated this damaging effect but caused an 
increase in gained profit on top of the statistical forecasting model. While the percentages expressed 
in the results section may be seen as small numbers, it is important to note that these correspond to 
large differences in absolute profit numbers. The translation from error measures to profit margins 
provides a unique opportunity for a better communication between researchers and practitioners 
on the importance of improved forecasting accuracy. 
Fourth, the integrative approach has a high chance of being seen as acceptable by the 
forecasters, since it does not take away their input and thus sense of ownership. Previous efforts 
aimed at reducing error due to faulty judgment in forecasting have focussed on biases associated 
with judgment, and on de-biasing approaches. A popular technique has been de-biasing via 
consciously attempting to correct judgment via advice or explicitly pointing towards the declining 
accuracy. While this technique has the potential to be applicable to biases that can vary over time, 
judgmental forecasters however, seem to persist in their damaging adjustments (Lim & O'Connor, 
1995). Önkal and Gönül (2005) interviewed forecasters and found that they not only adjust to 
integrate their knowledge, but also to own the forecasts, contribute to the forecasts and gain a 
sense of control over them. Consequently, when forecasters are advised to leave the forecast alone, 
this sense of ownership is taken away from them, possibly leading to resistance to this way of 
working. With an integrative approach on the other hand, the possibility remains for the forecasters 
to provide their input, while simultaneously correcting for possible damaging adjustments. Indeed, 
forecasters continue to be asked for their input. Additionally, the integrative model takes the 
judgment variable into account according to its predictive power in past forecasts. Increased 
judgmental accuracy in the past will therefore lead to increased impact of the judgment of the 
forecasters in the present. If the forecasters performs badly, e.g. consistent under-forecasting by a 
50 
 
sales forecaster to easily achieve its target, judgment will no longer have a significant influence on 
the forecast result. This method would thus motivate forecasters to perform accurately and more 
objectively. Additionally, forecasters can be informed on when to rely on their own judgment 
(restrictive) and when to rely on the integrative model for better results. 
 
6.3. Limitations and further research 
The study has some limitations. First, the dataset contains information about forecasts, 
adjustments, sales numbers and profit from a single company. However, our analysis finds the same 
pattern as previous studies (e.g., Fildes et al., 2009), providing an indication that the data is 
comparable. Similar to previous literature (Fildes et al., 2009), negative adjustments were more 
profitable than positive adjustments. Similar to Sanders and Ritzman (1992), judgmental adjustment 
was found to be beneficial in high volatility series, measured both by the forecast error and the 
classification by the company. In low volatility series, restrictive judgment damaged accuracy. Given 
the large similarities in data patterns, results should hold in further research with the integrative 
model in other companies, to further test the robustness of this solution. Additionally, qualitative 
inquiry is needed to test the acceptance of this new method by the forecast users. Previous research 
has indicated trust issues with forecast support systems that restrict judgment (Goodwin, et al., 
2011). 
The proposed method should counter the negative effects of judgmental adjustments, while 
retaining the positive feelings of the forecaster concerning their input, value and ownership. Last, in 
this study, including judgment in an integrative way improves performance consistently. 
Unfortunately, while the integrative judgment was able to translate all damaging judgmental 
adjustments into beneficial adjustments, it also tempered the magnitude of the beneficial 
judgmental adjustments. Future research should further look into optimizing the effects of 
integrative judgment, such that the beneficial effects of judgment remain equally large. A possible 
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This study looked into a forecasting model which integrated expert adjustment into the 
model itself. The results show that there is a beneficial effect of integrative judgment, compared to 
the restrictive approach and the basic statistical model. The dataset was tested extensively 
according to size of the adjustments, their direction, and the volatility of the data. The latter was 
tested in two ways: by using the Standard Deviation (Fildes et al., 2009) and by using a category as 
defined by the company. Results showed similar patterns to the extensive dataset of Fildes et al. 
(2009), indicating a level of comparability between our dataset and others. Additionally, this study 
takes into account the call for judgmental forecasting researchers to pay attention to hierarchical 
levels of forecasts (Kremer, et al., 2015). The analyses show the added value of the integrated 
approach on both levels of granularity. Lastly, this study was able to provide an insight into the 
direct financial consequences of improved forecasting accuracy. The relationship with direct 
financial gain is close to non-existent in judgmental forecasting literature, while it plays a pivotal role 
for the practitioner. Improving forecasting accuracy in practice is an important task for researchers 
in our field (Sanders & Manrodt, 2003). This study thus responds to a call for more research with 
company data (Sanders, 2009). The integrative approach can de-bias judgmental forecasting without 
negatively affecting feelings of ownership from the forecaster. It improved forecasting accuracy and 
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 Enhanced anchoring effects produced by the 








Are judgmental forecasters more accurate when they are given statistical forecasts? People 
saw graphs of past sales figures, together with information about promotions that affected them. 
They made forecasts for normal periods and for periods in which promotions were planned. The 
presence or absence of statistical forecasts was manipulated. In Experiment 1, these forecasts 
impaired forecasting accuracy relative to that obtained with unaided judgment. To test whether this 
effect arose because the line on the graph showing the history of past statistical forecasts produced 
an enhanced visual anchor, Experiment 2 included statistical forecasts only for the future periods 
that were to be predicted. The detrimental effect of providing statistical forecasts was maintained. 
In both Experiments 1 and 2, 40% of past sales periods contained promotions. With fewer 
promotions, the statistical forecasts would be much closer to sales level of the periods without 
promotions in the displayed series. As a result, forecasting errors due to anchoring should be much 
smaller on normal periods – and the enhanced anchoring effects produced by the presence of a 
statistical forecast should matter less. To test this, the proportion of promotions in the past data was 
reduced to 10% in Experiment 3. This removed the detrimental effect of statistical forecasts for 
normal periods but not for promotional ones. Our findings provide a cautionary tale in the 
application of statistical forecasting in time series with disturbances. 
 






It is generally accepted that the presence of a statistical forecast has the potential to 
improve on a forecast made by judgment alone. Both judgment and statistical models have their 
strengths and weaknesses. Formal models can outperform judgment when it comes to consistency 
or the processing of large amounts of data.  However, formal models tend to have difficulties with 
discontinuities, unexpected events and external influences (Armstrong & Collopy, 1998; Goodwin, 
2002; Hughes, 2001; Taleb, 2007). Judgment is deemed especially useful for dealing with special 
events such as these. Promotional investments and their effects on future sales numbers are 
examples of them that have been studied experimentally (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999). 
Increasingly sophisticated methods have been developed to enable better promotional 
forecasting (e.g., Trapero, Kourentzes, & Fildes, 2015; Trapero, et al., 2013). However, a number of 
difficulties have come to light. People make insufficient use of provided forecasts (e.g., Lim & 
O'Connor, 1996) and tend to discount ‘advice’ from a formal model (Goodwin, et al., 2007; Önkal, et 
al., 2009). Also, surveys have shown that practitioners are slow in adopting formal methods 
(Lawrence, 2000; Sanders & Manrodt, 2003) and that statistical tools in organizations tend to be 
distrusted and quickly fall into disuse (Zbaracki, 1998).  Because of these problems, much of the 
literature on judgmental forecasting literature and on forecast support systems has focussed on 
methods designed to facilitate the acceptance of statistical forecasts by forecasters (e.g., Fildes, et 
al., 2006; Goodwin, et al., 2007). 
The role of judgment cannot be underestimated. Surveys indicate that it plays an important 
role in practice (e.g., Sanders & Manrodt, 1994; Sanders & Manrodt, 2003), either because 
practitioners make forecasts using unaided judgment or because they combine their judgment with 
forecasts derived from a formal model. It is often assumed that the latter produces better results 
and that our efforts should therefore be geared to increasing its use. However, to date, there is only 
limited research that has directly compared unaided judgmental forecasting and combined 
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forecasting within the same dataset and group of forecasters. Here, we address this fundamental 
question: Does provision of statistical forecasts improve the accuracy of judgmental forecasting?  
A number of factors provide context to our investigation. First, as mentioned above, formal 
models can have difficulty in allowing for the effects of sporadic external events. Second, 
practitioners tend to resist the introduction of sophisticated formal models (Asimakopoulos, 2013; 
Fildes, et al., 2006). Third, judgment is pervasive in forecasting practice (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007; 
Goodwin, 2002). Fourth, practitioners with causal information make better forecasts than statistical 
methods or practitioners without that information (e.g., Armstrong, 1983; Edmundson, Lawrence, & 
O’Connor, 1988; Lawrence, O’Connor, & Edmundson, 2000). 
To develop our hypotheses, we review papers that report experiments or analyse 
organisational data that include a) judgmental forecasts made with the access to statistical forecasts 
and b) past and future periods with and without promotions. Thus, we do not cover papers in which 
no distinction is made between promotion and non-promotional periods (e.g., Fildes, et al., 2009), 
papers in which forecasting is purely statistical (e.g., Trapero, et al., 2015), or papers in which the 
size of future promotional effects is estimated without forecasts being made (e.g., Lee, Goodwin, 
Fildes, Nikolopoulos, & Lawrence, 2007). 
 
2. Literature background and development of hypotheses 
 
Lim and O’Connor (1996) first required people to forecast soft drink sales from a time series 
of past sales. Then they presented them with a) causal information (air temperature) relevant to the 
forecasting period, b) a statistical forecast that did not take this causal information into account, or 
c) both the causal information and the statistical forecast. Participants adjusted their original 
forecast to take this new information into account. It was found that, though forecasts were 
improved after receiving temperature information, this improvement was small and no greater 
when a statistical forecast was provided. This may have been because people are conservative when 
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making sequential adjustments (Harvey & Fischer, 1997), because forecasters were presented only 
with temperature information relevant to only the current forecast period and would have had to 
mentally integrate information from past periods to judge its effect on sales, or because 
temperature information was always present and so forecasters could not compare outcomes when 
it was available with when it was not. 
Goodwin and Fildes (1999) used an experimental design that was not affected by these 
problems. They employed a simple extrapolative forecasting task rather than an adjustment task; no 
learning was necessary because information about the size of causal factors affecting past data 
points was presented as vertical bars (labelled ‘promotional expenditure’) on the same graph as the 
time series that had to be forecast; promotions were sporadic, affecting about half the time periods 
in the presented series. In their experiment, series were either simple (independent points scattered 
around a constant mean) or complex (linear trend with a multiplicative seasonal pattern 
superimposed) and contained either high or low noise. The relation between the size of the 
promotion and its effect in elevating sales was always linear but was either weak or strong. 
Participants were asked to made successive forecasts for the same time series. The outcome of the 
series was updated before each new forecast was made. Thus, all participants received immediate 
outcome feedback. Some participants received statistical forecasts based on exponential smoothing 
of past data cleaned of promotional effects. When these forecasts were given, they were shown for 
the whole of the presented series as well as for the upcoming required forecast. 
Goodwin and Fildes (1999) found that forecasts for non-promotional periods were worse 
when promotions had a stronger effect on sales: this was presumably because effects of promotions 
appeared to add a higher level of noise to the series when they were stronger and this impaired 
forecasting for periods without promotions. They also found that provision of statistical forecasts 
had no effect on forecasts for periods with promotions and that they improved forecasts for periods 
without promotions only when series were complex or contained high noise.  Thus, despite using a 
different experimental design from that of Lim and O’Connor (1996), Goodwin and Fildes’ (1999, p. 
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49) conclusions were similar: “The main finding of this study is that, while judgmental forecasters 
benefited from the availability of statistical forecasts under certain conditions, they almost always 
made insufficient use of these forecasts. … In Lim and O’Connor’s study subjects had already made 
an initial forecast before they were presented with the statistical forecast. Our study suggests that 
this underweighting prevails even when the statistical forecast is presented before the judgmental 
forecast has been formed”. 
Goodwin, Fildes, Lawrence and Stephens (2011) developed Goodwin and Fildes’ (1999) 
research further. Series were again either relatively simple or more complex and contained either 
high or low noise. Presentation of the time series and the promotional events was the same as 
before, though it appears that promotions were less frequent. In this study, participants’ forecasts 
made with statistical forecasts were not compared to those made without them. Instead the aim 
was to investigate whether better use would be made of statistical forecasts when large changes 
away from those forecasts were restricted (i.e., forbidden) or when guidance was given about the 
appropriateness of making changes away from those forecasts. Thus, participants could use 
statistical forecasts without restriction or guidance, with restriction but no guidance, or with 
guidance but no restriction. Analyses showed that guidance failed to improve performance and that 
restriction impaired it. Generally, judgmental forecasts for promotion periods were better than raw 
statistical forecasts whereas those for non-promotion periods were worse. These effects did not 
interact with series type. 
In summary, Goodwin and Fildes (1999) found that providing statistical forecasts to support 
judgment (J +S) produced no increase in accuracy over judgment alone (J) on either promotional or 
non-promotional periods when series were ‘simple’.  (They improved accuracy for non-promotional 
periods only when series that contained high noise levels and/or complex pattern information.) 
Goodwin et al (2011) found that judgment combined with a statistical forecast (J+S) outperformed 
the raw statistical forecast (S) only on promotional periods and that this finding did not differ 
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according to noise level or complexity of the data series. Combining both studies, we hypothesize 
that, for relatively simple series:  
 
H1: the accuracy of different types of forecast will depend on the period type, such that  
H1a: For promotional periods, unaided judgment (J) and judgment combined with a formal 
model (J+S) will outperform the raw statistical forecast (S). 
H1b: For normal periods, the raw statistical forecast (S) and judgment combined with a 
formal model (J+S) will outperform unaided judgment (J). 
 
Webby, O’Connor and Edmundson’s (2005) gave participants a time series that was subject 
to sporadic perturbations in both upward and downward directions arising from factors such as 
promotions and competitors’ promotions. Perturbations affecting the 48 periods of the presented 
time series occurred in both directions whereas those affecting the 12 forecast periods were all in 
the upward direction. Participants were asked a) to remove the effects of the perturbing events 
from the presented series, b) to make extrapolations from the resulting underlying series for the 12 
periods requiring forecasts, and c) to add the effects of the expected perturbations to these 
extrapolations to produce final forecasts. Results showed that, when removing or adding effects of 
perturbations, participants were conservative: they made insufficient adjustment to allow for the 
effects of the perturbations. Thus, it appears that the trend line of the underlying time series acted 
as a mental anchor and that adjustments relative to it showed the insufficiency that is typically 
observed when the anchor-and-adjustment heuristic is used (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, 
these anchoring effects were superimposed on an optimism bias that affected extrapolation of the 
underlying time series. This optimism bias was greater when more events perturbed the presented 
and forecast sections of the series. Webby et al (2005) suggest that more events increase 
forecasters’ cognitive load and this leaves them more susceptible to cognitive biases, a notion that is 
consistent with Kahneman’s (2011) two-system theory of cognition.  
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Optimism (the tendency to over-forecast desirable quantities, such as sales or profits) is a 
well-established phenomenon in the forecasting literature (Eggleton, 1982; Harvey & Bolger, 1996; 
Lawrence & Makridakis, 1989). Trapero, Pedregal, Fildes and Kourentzes (2013) found evidence for it 
in their analyses of data obtained from a manufacturing company. What marked their work out was 
that they were able to obtain statistical forecasts and final forecasts for both promotional and non-
promotional periods: “this is the first case study to employ organizational data for verifying whether 
judgmental forecasts during promotional periods achieve lower forecasting errors than their 
statistical counterparts” (Trapero, et al., 2013, p. 235). The dataset comprised 18,096 data triplets 
(i.e., statistical forecast, final forecast, outcome) from 169 SKUs. Eight percent of the triplets were 
for promotional periods. Statistical forecasts were based solely on time series information and so 
took no account of the effect of promotions. In other words, they were not ‘cleaned’ of promotions. 
Because of this and because promotional periods were relatively rare, accuracy of statistical 
forecasts was lower for promotional periods than for non-promotional ones. This was at least partly 
because statistical forecasts were slightly too high for non-promotional periods but much too low for 
promotional ones. 
Analyses showed that final, adjusted forecasts were less accurate than statistical ones, 
particularly for promotional periods. Overall, adjustment produced final forecasts that were 
overestimates and considerably higher than the statistical forecasts.  The authors attributed this to 
optimism. More detailed analysis showed that small negative adjustments improved and large 
positive adjustments impaired accuracy on non-promotional periods whereas small positive 
adjustments improved and other adjustments impaired accuracy on promotional periods. These 
patterns are to be expected given the under-forecasting of the statistical model for promotional 
periods and the over-forecasting for normal periods.  
While Webby et al (2005) showed that when forecasters are explicitly presented with time 
series information, adjustments for events such as promotions were insufficient – presumably due 
to mental anchoring on the mean or trend line of the presented time series. This was not found by 
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Trapero et al’s (2013) in their analysis of organizational data. One possible explanation is that 
forecasters in the manufacturing company did not consider time series information that was long 
enough to produce the anchoring effect.  Goodwin and Fildes’ (2011) survey of company forecasting 
behaviour showed that forecasts are often based on very short data series (e.g., six points). Thus, 
our second hypothesis is that when forecasters are explicitly presented with time series information: 
 
H2a: Mental anchoring on the series mean will produce under-forecasting for promotional 
periods but over-forecasting for non-promotional ones. 
 
Would a statistical forecast help alleviate any such bias? To emulate the real-life forecasts 
examined by Trapero et al (2013) and Fildes et al (2009) as well as possible, statistical forecasts in 
this study did not distinguish between promotional and normal periods. It is therefore unlikely that 
they would lessen an anchoring bias based on this distinction. 
 
H2b: The presence of a statistical model will not affect the mental anchoring bias outlined in 
H2a. 
 
We expect that the optimism effects identified by Trapero et al (2013) will be overlaid on the 
anchoring bias. Assuming that the effects of these two biases are additive, over-forecasting of 
normal periods will be larger than under-forecasting of promotional periods. Thus, our next 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3a: the positive directional error of normal periods will be greater than the negative 




Statistical forecasts are not subject to optimism. Thus, if people are influenced by statistical 
forecasts, the optimism bias should be reduced. 
 
H3b: the asymmetry described in H3a will be less in the presence of a statistical forecast 
 
To successfully allow for the effects of promotions when adjusting statistical forecasts, 
forecasters must appreciate the relation between the size of promotions and the size of their 
effects. For convenience, we term this relation the ‘promotion function’. Our remaining hypotheses 
focus on biases related to the forecasters’ perception of this function.  
Range contraction effects (Poulton, 1989) are one of the foundations of range-frequency 
theory (Parducci, 1965, 1973), a psychophysical model of context effects. When people respond to a 
range of values on some scale, the range of their responses on that scale tends to be less than that 
of the range of the stimuli to which they respond. In other words, their response range is contracted, 
compared to the stimulus range. The effect may arise because people mentally anchor their 
judgments on the centre of the range of values and under-adjust away from this anchor when 
producing their judgments. In our experiments, elevations in sales produced by promotions are 
linearly related to the size of those promotions. Because of range contraction, regression of the 
elevations implied by people’s forecasts on to the size of planned promotions should reveal a slope 
that is less than the actual slope characterizing the relation between sales elevation and promotion 
size. Naturally, we expect that participants realize that a planned promotion with zero investment 
will have not raise sales at all: the zero point should therefore be fixed. As a result, forecasters who 
treat the slope of the promotion function slope as too flat (because they are influenced by range 
contraction) will increasingly underestimate the effects of promotions as those promotions increase 
in size: 
 




As our statistical forecasts take no account of the difference between promotional and non-
promotional periods, we do not expect them to influence range contraction effects. 
 
H4b: the presence of a statistical effect will not influence the effect hypothesized in H4a. 
 
How do people allow for promotions when adjusting statistical forecasts? One possibility is 
that they first use the past sales figures from periods without promotions to produce a baseline 
forecast. Then they search back through the presented series for an instance in which the promotion 
is the closest in size to the one planned for the forecast period. They estimate the sales elevation 
associated with this past promotion and then add it to their baseline forecast.  Goodwin and Fildes 
(1999) argued that forecasters in their task used this instance-based strategy. However, forecasters 
may use a rule-base strategy instead. They could inspect the series, together with the various 
promotions that perturb it, and extract a rule that relates sales elevation to promotion size by 
performing a mental ‘regression’. They would then just need to insert the size of the promotion 
planned for the forecast period into this rule to obtain their estimate of the appropriate sales 
elevation to add to their baseline forecast.  
Researchers into function learning have carried out experiments to determine the conditions 
under which people use instance-based strategies and the conditions under which they adopt rule-
based ones (McDaniel, Dimperio, Griego, & Busemeyer, 2009). In our task, forecasters do not have 
to learn the promotion function. What they need to do is better characterized as function extraction. 
Nevertheless, we can use the strategies adopted by those working on function learning to 
distinguish between instance-based and rule-based strategies in our forecasting task. A rule-based 
strategy enables people to make estimates beyond the range of their experience more easily than an 
instance-based strategy. The latter, being an associative model, tends to fail when applied to a 
testing range that is outside of the stimulus range. Hence, we compare the absolute error of 
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forecasts for periods within and outside the range of promotions displayed in the presented series. If 
Goodwin and Fildes (1999) are correct in assuming that an instance-based strategy is used, we 
expect errors in the latter case to be larger than those of the former one. 
 
H5: forecasters use an instance-based strategy that results in the forecasting error being 
smaller when the planned promotion is within the range of those presented with the displayed series 
than when it is outside that range. 
 
3. Experiment 1 
We report an experiment based on the paradigm developed by Goodwin and Fildes (1999) 
and Goodwin et al (2011). Forecasters were presented with time series that were sporadically 
perturbed upwards by promotions and were required to make forecasts for periods with and 
without planned promotions. Our primary focus is on identifying the conditions under which 
performance is better with a statistical forecast than without one. 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1. Participants A total of 41 prospective students from University College London 
participated in the study. Their mean age was 18.15 (SD = 1.86) and 28 of them were female. 
3.1.2 Stimulus materials Forty 50-point sales series were simulated. For each one, a grey line 
graph represented the sales history of a product of the past 50 weeks. R statistical software was 
used to generate 40 time series with a mean of 300 and an error level of 21 (7% of the mean). In half 
of the resulting series, the sales were independent (M = 299.56, SD = 21.53) and, in the other half, 
sales were sequentially dependent (M = 298.79, SD = 19.48, ρ = 0.7).  
Half of both types of series contained a statistical forecast (an additional line graph) and half 
did not. The statistical forecast was calculated via the Holt-Winters exponential smoothing method. A 
line graph represented the statistical forecast history from week 2 to week 52 (Figure 1). 
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Bars indicated the presence of a promotional expenditure for the product involved. Out of the 
50 weeks, 20 weeks were randomly chosen to have a promotion. Promotion size was randomized over 
these 20 locations with one promotion for every tenth value between 50 and 200. The size of the 





∗ 	#  
 
This indicates a percentage increase (PI) on period t over the regular sales (S) for period t that 
is equal to one fifth of the promotional expenditure (P) on period t. 
For each series, participants were asked to forecast one step ahead and two steps ahead. A 
promotion was present either on time period 51 or time period 52. The size of this promotion was 
randomly selected across trials from a range between 30 and 220 (every tenth value) for every 
participant. Thus, participants had to take account of four promotion sizes (30, 40, 210, 220) that were 
not within the range of promotions (50 - 200) that were included in the displayed sales series. 
Figure 1. Example of the screen display for Experiment 1. 
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3.1.3. Design The study was conducted as a 2 (statistical forecast presence) x 2 (promotion 
presence) within-subjects experiment. A series of 40 graphs were created, each consisting of 50-point 
time series.  
3.1.4 Procedure Prior to the start of the experiment, participants were given a brief 
explanation about the different aspects of the graphs that would be presented to them: a line 
representing the sales history of a product, bars indicating the occasional presence and size of 
promotions and in half of the cases, an additional line indicating the statistical forecast history. 
Participants were instructed that this statistical forecast was based on a simple model of past sales 
data that took no account of whether or not promotions were present. They were told they could 
choose whether or not to follow the statistical forecast. They were further informed that the goal of 
the experiment was to forecast as accurately as possible. Series were randomized for each participant. 
They completed the set of 40 forecasting trials, were thanked, and de-briefed. 
3.2 Results 
Error measures were calculated relative to the ideal forecast (i.e., the time series signal 
excluding the noise on non-promotional periods and the signal plus the promotion effect on 
promotional periods).  Mean absolute error (MAE) provided a measure of overall forecast accuracy.  
Mean error (ME), provided a measure of directional error. It was calculated as the ideal forecast minus 
participant’s forecast, so that negative ME indicates under-forecasting and positive directional error 
indicates over-forecasting.  
Outlier analysis indicated two participants scored more than two standard deviations away 
from the mean in at least half of the trials and they were therefore excluded.  
3.2.1. Mean absolute error Results for MAE are shown in Table 1. Overall, its mean value was 
33.93 (SD = 8.53). To investigate the effects of the two independent variables (statistical forecast 
presence, promotion presence), a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run. This 
showed a main effect of the presence of a statistical forecast (F(1, 38) = 5.29, p = .027), with MAE 
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higher for series with a statistical forecast (M = 35.08, SD = 7.31) than for series without a statistical 
forecast (M = 32.77, SD = 10.52). Neither the main effect of the presence of a promotion nor the 
interaction of this variable with the presence of a statistical forecast approached significance. 
 
Table 1  
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1:  MAE and ME for periods with and without promotions and for 
trials with and without statistical forecasts 
Independent Variables MAE SD ME SD 
  
Raw statistical model Promotion 51.42 7.59 49.48 8.64 
No promotion 26.80 70 -24.99 0 
Aided judgment Promotion 34.80 10.69 -15.98 18.12 
 No promotion 35.37 10.32 20.77 14.84 
Unaided judgment Promotion 32.93 14.20 -14.23 20.60 
 No promotion 32.62 10.33 12.36 15.08 
 
Statistical forecasts (MAE = 39.11, SD = 3.79) were outperformed by both unaided judgment 
(t (38) = 3.68, p = .001) and combined judgment (t (38) = 3.30, p = .002). The statistical model 
performed better on normal periods (MAE = 26.80, SD = 0) than on promotional periods (MAE = 51.42, 
SD = 7.59): this difference was significant (t (38) = -20.26, p < .001). These results are not consistent 
with Hypothesis 1. First, MAE for unaided (J) and combined forecasts (J+S) did not depend on whether 
a promotion was planned. Second, unaided judgment (J) outperformed both statistical forecasts (S) 
and combined forecasts (J + S).  
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3.2.2. Mean error Results for ME are shown in Table 1. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed 
a main effect of the presence of a statistical forecast (F (1, 38) = 4.96, p = .032), with ME for series with 
a statistical forecast equal to -2.40 (SD = 11.76) and for series without a statistical forecast equal to 
.93 (SD = 9.55). There was also a main effect for the presence of the promotion (F (1, 38) = 58.52, p < 
.001), with ME for a period with a promotion present equal to -15.10 (SD = 17.98) and ME for a normal 
period equal to 16.56 (SD = 14.03). Finally, there was a significant interaction effect between the two 
variables (F (1, 38) = 13.78, p = .001). Tests for simple effects of the effect of the presence of a statistical 
forecast showed that the effect of this variable was significant when there was no promotion was 
present (F (1, 38) = 25.77; p < .001) but was not significant when one was present (F (1, 38) = .564; p 
= .457). 
One-sample t-tests showed that ME for series without promotions (Mean = 16.56; SD = 14.03) 
was significantly above zero (t (38) = 7.37, p < .001). In contrast, ME for series with promotions (Mean 
= -15.13; SD = 17.98) was significantly below zero (t (38) = -5.25, p < .001). These results are consistent 
with Hypothesis 2a: we obtained under-forecasting for periods with promotions but over-forecasting 
for periods without them. They are not consistent with Hypothesis 2b. This stated that the presence 
of a statistical forecast would not influence the effect identified in Hypothesis 2a. In fact, it did 
influence this effect but only when no promotion was present. 
According to Hypothesis 3, optimism results in over-forecasting for non-promotional periods 
being greater than under-forecasting for promotional periods.  In fact, tests for simple effects showed 
that this occurred only when statistical forecasts were present.   
3.2.3. Analyses of the implied promotion function To test Hypothesis 4, a regression line was 
calculated for every participant separately. For each planned promotion value, the mean elevation in 
the participant’s forecast relative to the case when there was no promotion was calculated as a 
proportion of sales. This elevation was then regressed on to the sales value to obtain the promotion 
function implied by that person’s forecasts (linear, quadratic, and cubic terms were included in these 
regressions). The mean linear slope of these regression lines in trials without a statistical forecast 
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(Figure 2a) was .51 (SD = .24), significantly different from the slope (.60) of the actual promotion 
function (t (38) = -2.423; p = .020). Their mean slope when there was a statistical forecast (Figure 2b) 
was .48 (SD = .19), again significantly different from the slope of the actual promotion function (t (38) 
= -4.38; p < .001). Mean values of the slopes, intercepts, Fischer-transformed R² values, and residual 
errors are shown are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Mean values of regression parameters for the implied promotion functions when statistical forecasts 
were present and absent. 
Independent 
Variables 
Slope Intercept R² (Fischer 
transformed) 
Residual error 
Statistical forecast 0.48 .106 0.446 1458.52 
No statistical forecast 0.51 -1.77 0.823 668.30 
 
Separate one-way ANOVAs on these data sets indicated that the presence of a statistical 
forecast reduced the linear fit: significant effects were obtained for R² (F (1, 76) = 19.04; p < .001) and 
residual error (F (1, 76) = 26.83; p < .001). However, as Hypothesis 4 states, there was no effect of the 
presence of a statistical forecast on slope: the range contraction effect was unaffected by the 




Figure 2a. Implied versus theoretical elevation of the promotional increase in the presence of a 
statistical forecast 
 
Figure 2b. Implied versus theoretical elevation of the promotional increase without a statistical 
forecast 
More specifically, for trials without a statistical forecast, data for the majority of the 
participants (31 out of 39) were best fitted by a linear model (Figure 3). Data from the remaining eight 
participants did not fit any of the tested models (linear, quadratic, cubic). Thus the linear model fitted 
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forecast, data were fitted best by a linear model in 20 cases, by a quadratic model in five cases, and 
by no model in 14 cases. Overall, no model provided the best fit significantly more often than the 
other two models (χ² = (1, 39) = 5.08, p = .079). These results suggest that the presence of the statistical 
forecast made it difficult for people to appreciate the linear nature of the promotion function. 
 
 
Figure 3. Categorization of models according to presence of a statistical forecast 
 
Promotions affecting past data points in the time series ranged in size between 50 and 200.  
In contrast, the planned promotions that participants had to take into account when making their 
forecasts ranged in size between 30 and 220. Forecast errors that are no greater for promotions 
outside of the example range (30, 40, 210, 220) than for those within it (50-200) would be consistent 
with participants’ use of a rule-based strategy. However, as Hypothesis 5 states, higher forecast errors 
for promotions outside the example range than within the example range would be more consistent 
with use of an instance-based strategy.  
First, we compared forecast error when planned promotions were inside the example range 
(MAE = 34.59, SD = 10.87) with that obtained when planned promotions were 30 and 40 and, hence, 
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beneath the example range (MAE = 27.88, SD = 15.68). This revealed that error was significantly higher 
in the former case (t (38) = -3.71, p < .001). Next, we compared forecast error when planned 
promotions were the inside range with that obtained when planned promotions were 210 and 220 
and, hence, beyond the example range (MAE = 39.69, SD = 19.70). Now error was significantly higher 
in the latter case (t (38) = 3.75, p < .001). Figure 4 shows MAE across all promotion sizes. The graph 
suggests an increase in error with increasing promotion size. A regression analysis confirms a linear 
relationship between promotional size and MAE (F (1, 18) = 19.95, p < .001, R² = .53). This is consistent 
with the Weber’s Law: error is proportional to stimulus magnitude (Fechner, 1858; Weber, 1934).  
 
Figure 4. Mean absolute error per promotion size: lower outside range (MAE = 27.88, SD = 15.68), 
inner range (MAE = 34.59, SD = 10.87), upper outside range (MAE = 39.69, SD = 19.70) 
3.3 Discussion 
Unaided judgment significantly outperformed both a combination of judgment and statistical 
forecasting and pure statistical forecasting. The detrimental effect of providing a statistical forecast 
implied by this result was unexpected and occurred irrespective of whether a promotion was planned 
or not. In Goodwin and Fildes (1999) and Lim and O’Connor’s (1996) studies, providing judges with 
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series1). However, there was no evidence that those forecasts had a detrimental effect. In our study, 
statistical forecasts impaired accuracy. Why did this occur? 
There were strong anchoring effects in our study. These produced under-forecasting on 
promotional periods and over-forecasting on normal ones. Furthermore, we found that, in normal 
periods at least, these anchoring effects were stronger when statistical forecasts were provided. This 
increased level of bias could be responsible for the lower accuracy that we observed when participants 
had access to such forecasts. It is possible that the additional line on the graph of the data series that 
displayed the history of the statistical forecasts strengthened the anchoring effect. Lawrence and 
O’Connor (1992) argued that forecasters anchor on the mean level of the series. Providing the history 
of the statistical forecast in the form of additional line on the graph may have made this mean more 
salient and therefore have strengthened the anchoring effect. In the next experiment, we test this 
possibility.  
4. Experiment 2 
In this experiment, participants were provided with statistical forecasts for only the periods 
for which sales had to be forecast. This approach is one that has been adopted in the past by Önkal 
and her colleagues (e.g., Gönül, Önkal, & Lawrence, 2006; Önkal, Gönul, & Lawrence, 2008). If the line 
displaying the history of previous statistical forecasts does indeed increase anchoring biases, removing 
it should eliminate or lessen the detrimental effect of providing statistical forecasts. 
4.1 Method 
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1, except that statistical forecasts were 
displayed only for the period for which forecasts were required. 
                                                            
1 Though we included autoregressive and independent series to ensure that results generalize over more than 
one series type, this was not an independent variable in our design. However, post-hoc test analysis showed 
that series type did not interact with the presence of a statistical forecast in our study (F (1, 38) = .59, p = .447). 
This may have been because, compared to the complex series studied by Goodwin and Fildes (1999), both 
types of series employed here were relatively simple. 
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4.1.1. Participants Forty-one participants were recruited online as participants in the study. 
Their mean age was 37.33 years (SD = 12.97 years) and 23 of them were female. 
4.1.2. Stimulus materials, design and procedure In the instructions and in the experiment, the 
statistical forecasts were presented as shown in Figure 5. In all other respects, the experiment was 
identical to the first one. 
 
Figure 5. Example of the screen display for Experiment 2. 
4.2 Results 
Overall level of performance of this experiment (MAE = 31.29, SD = 9.24) and the previous 
one (MAE = 33.99, SD = 9.30) were not significantly different. MAE scores for periods with and 
without promotions and for trials with and without statistical forecasts are shown in Table 3. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA using presence of a statistical forecast and presence of a promotion as 
within-participant variables revealed only a main effect  showing that the presence of a statistical 
forecast impaired accuracy (F (1, 40) = 17.55, p < .001).  
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Purely statistical forecasts had a mean MAE of 40.92 (SD = 3.48) and were inferior to both 
unaided judgmental forecasts (t (40) =6.61; p < .001) and combined forecasts (t (40) = 5.50 ; p < 
.001).   
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 2:  MAE and ME for periods with and without promotions and for 
trials with and without statistical forecasts 
Independent Variables MAE SD ME SD 
  
Raw statistical forecast Promotion 55.04 6.96 53.74 7.33 
No Promotion 26.80 0 -26.73 0 
Aided judgment Promotion 32.24 9.33 -14.96 17.27 
 No promotion 34.71 11.44 24.73 14.44 
Unaided judgment Promotion 29.25 11.22 -13.25 15.83 
 No promotion 28.94 12.56 10.18 13.14 
 
 
ME scores are shown in Table 3. A repeated-measures ANOVA using presence of a statistical 
forecast and presence of a promotion as within-participant variables revealed a main effect of the 
presence of a statistical forecast (F (1, 40) = 20.05, p < .001), a main effect of presence of a promotion 
(F (1, 40) = 91.67, p < .001), and an interaction effect between these two variables (F (1, 40) = 91.67, 
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p < .001). These findings closely replicate those obtained in Experiment 1. Under-forecasting occurred 
on promotion periods whereas over-forecasting occurred on normal ones. These effects are consistent 
with under-adjustment from an anchor (represented by the mean of the series). Presence of a 
statistical forecast did not affect under-adjustment when there was a promotion but more than 
doubled the size of the anchoring effect on normal periods. 
4.3 Discussion  
As Experiment 1, the presence of a statistical forecast significantly impaired performance. An 
ANOVA using experiment as a between-participants variable showed that there was no significant 
difference in the size of this effect between the two experiments. Eliminating the forecast history as 
a source of mental anchoring did not have the expected effect: there was no evidence that the line 
representing the history of the statistical forecasts increased anchoring in the manner that we 
hypothesized.  
The Holt-Winters exponential smoothing model that was used to produce the statistical 
forecasts processed the data without distinguishing between normal periods and those affected by 
promotions2.  Because of this, the high proportion of periods in the displayed series that were 
perturbed by promotions would have produced a high level of noise in the data input to the 
statistical model. The data series may have been too noisy for the simple statistical model to prove 
useful. By combining the judgmental forecasts with these low quality statistical ones, participants 
reduced their accuracy below that produced by their unaided judgment. 
Because the statistical forecast did not distinguish between promotional and normal periods, 
its long-term expected value would correspond to a weighted average of the mean sales on 
promotional periods and on normal periods. Given the high frequency of promotions in the time 
series (40%), this weighted average would be positioned almost half-way between the mean of the 
                                                            
2 This was also true of the statistical forecasts used by company that produced the data analysed by Fildes et al 
(2009) and Trapero et al (2013). 
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normal periods and the mean of the promotional periods. As a consequence, forecasters would have 
to adjust upward for a promotion and downward for a normal period. As we have seen, adjustment 
is difficult and produces errors that can be explained in terms of anchoring.  
This line of reasoning implies that the detrimental effect of statistical forecast would lessen if 
the proportion of promotions in the series were reduced. A less disturbed series would have three 
advantages. First, it would be visually less complex and should therefore be easier for forecasters to 
process. Second, with very few promotions, little downward adjustment of the statistical forecast 
would be needed on normal periods. Third, a time series with fewer perturbations would be treated 
as less noisy by the statistical model and, as a result, this model would produce more accurate 
forecasts3. 
5. Experiment 3 
In this third experiment, we hypothesize that the detrimental effect of the statistical forecast 
will be lower in time series in which only 10% of the periods are subject to perturbations (compared 
to previous experiments in which time series contained 40% of periods that were subject to 
perturbations). However, we predict that the mean error of the promotional forecasts will be higher 
in this new experiment than in Experiment 1. In all other respects, the experiment was the same as 
Experiment 1. 
5.1 Method 
5.1.1. Participants Forty participants were recruited online to take part in the study. Their 
mean age was 20.92 (SD = 1.54) and 21 of them were female. 
5.1.2. Stimulus materials, design and procedure The method was identical to that of 
Experiment 1, with the exception that the proportion of promotions was reduced from 40% to 10% of 
the data points (Figure 6).  
                                                            
3 On the other hand, fewer perturbations would mean that the promotion function is less well-defined: this 




Figure 6. Example of the screen display for Experiment 3. 
5.2 Results 
Outlier analysis revealed that two participants produced MAE scores that were more than two 
standard deviations away from the mean in more than half of the trials. They were removed from the 
dataset.  
Overall, unaided judgment (MAE = 24.70, SD = 6.81) performed better than combined 
judgment (MAE = 26.45, SD = 7.57). The difference between them was significant: t (37) = 2.24, p = 
.031. Pure statistical forecasts (MAE = 41.11, SD = 4.19) were worse than either unaided judgmental 
forecasts (t (37) =-11.63, p < .001) or combined forecasts (t (37) = -10.12, p < .001).  
Data for MAE with and without promotions and with and without statistical forecasts are 
shown in Table 4.  A repeated-measures ANOVA using presence of a statistical forecast and presence 
of a promotion as within-participant variables revealed a main effect of presence of a statistical 
forecast (F (1, 37) = 4.99, p = .032), a main effect of presence of a promotion ( F(1, 37) = 20.88, p < 
.001), and interaction between these two variables (F (1, 37) = 21.17, p < .001). Tests for simple effects 
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showed that the statistical forecast had no effect on normal periods (F (1, 37) = 1.53; p = .224) but 
impaired performance on promotional periods (F (1, 37) = 19.70; p < .001).  
Data for ME are shown in Table 4. A repeated-measures ANOVA using the same within-
participant variables as before revealed a main effect of presence of a promotion (F (1, 37) = 7.07, p = 
.012) and for an interaction between this variable and presence of a statistical forecast (F (1, 37) = 
15.99, p < .001). Simple effect analysis shows that provision of a statistical forecast made ME for 
promotion periods more negative (increased under-forecasting; F (1, 37) = 7.75, p = .008) but made 
ME for normal periods more positive (increased over-forecasting; F (1, 37) = 9.04, p = .005).  
 
Table 4  
Descriptive statistics for Experiment3:  MAE and ME for periods with and without promotions and for 
trials with and without statistical forecasts 
 
Independent Variables MAE SD ME SD 
  
Raw statistical forecast Promotion 70.26 8.38 71.68 8.50 
No promotion 11.97 0 -6.48 0 
Aided judgment Promotion 30.79 9.50 -4.69 18.05 
 No promotion 22.10 8.21 6.74 9.38 
Unaided judgment Promotion 26.13 6.98 -.04 13.37 






Lowering the proportion of perturbations reduced both overall error (MAE) and directional 
error (Figure 7a and 7b). For all combinations (Statistical forecast yes/no, Promotion yes/no), these 
errors were significantly lower (at the .01 level) than in the other two experiments. Additionally, the 
lower proportion of perturbations increased the difference between error on normal periods and 
error on periods with planned promotions. Whereas the effect of a promotion was not significant in 
the MAE analysis of Experiment 1 (F (1, 38) = .01, p = .948), it was in Experiment 3 (F (1, 37) = 20.88, 
p < .001). 
  
 















Mean Absolute Error across Experiments
Statistical Forecast - Promotion
Statistical Forecast - Normal
No Statistical forecast - Promotion




Figure 7b. Directional Error across Experiments 
Importantly, in Experiments 1 and 2, the provision of a statistical forecast damaged the 
accuracy on both normal periods and promotional periods. However, in Experiment 3, the presence 
of the statistical forecast was no longer detrimental to forecasting accuracy on normal periods. Due 
to the lower frequency of promotions, the appropriate forecast for normal periods was much closer 
to the mean of the series and so very little was adjustment necessary. Even with no adjustment 
away from the mean of the series, error in unaided judgmental forecasts would have been low. 
Furthermore, statistical forecasts for normal periods were usually close to the mean of the series. 
(The only exceptions would have been when a promotion perturbed the series on period 50 or 49 
and, hence, deflected the statistical forecast produced by the smoothing algorithm upwards.)  
Hence, in general, the appropriate forecast, the statistical forecast, and an unaided judgmental 
forecast based on minimal adjustment from the mean of the displayed series would have been 
closely aligned on normal periods: error in the unaided judgmental forecast would have been low 
and this error would not have been magnified by taking account of the statistical forecast.  
In contrast, when promotions were planned, unaided forecasters would have had to adjust 
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are subject to anchoring and, hence, typically insufficient. The statistical forecasts would again 
usually be close to the mean of the series.  Hence, people who considered them worth taking into 
account would have inhibited their (insufficient) tendency to adjust upwards and, as a result, their 
adjustments would have been even more insufficient than they were in the absence of statistical 
forecasts.  
 
 6 General Discussion 
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the effect of providing a statistical forecast 
on judgmental forecasting from time series affected by perturbations (promotions). This 
investigation was warranted by a number of factors: judgment is pervasive in practice (Fildes & 
Goodwin, 2007; Goodwin, 2002), formal models can have difficulty dealing with perturbed time 
series, practitioners resist introduction of these models (Asimakopoulos, 2013; Fildes, et al., 2006) 
(Asimakopolous & Dix, 2013; Fildes, Goodwin & Lawrence, 2006) and, importantly, practitioners with 
causal information are often able to make better forecasts than statistical methods or practitioners 
without that information (e.g., Armstrong, 1983; Edmundson, et al., 1988; Lawrence, et al., 2000). 
Based on the studies of Lim and O’Connor (1996), Goodwin and Fildes (1999) and Goodwin et al. 
(2011), we predicted that, for normal periods, judgmental forecasts would be more accurate with 
the provision of a statistical forecast. For promotional periods, both unaided judgment and 
combined judgment were expected to outperform the statistical forecast.  
The first experiment showed that promotional periods are under-forecast and normal 
periods are over-forecast, confirming the findings of Webby et al (2005).  Such effects imply 
anchoring on the series mean. These effects occurred regardless of the presence of a statistical 
forecast. We found no evidence of optimism bias, neither in unaided judgment trials nor in trials 
with a statistical forecast. Range contraction (Poulton, 1989) affected people’s appreciation of the 
promotion function; in particular, large promotional effects were strongly under-estimated. This 
effect was not influenced by the presence of a statistical forecast. However, statistical forecasts 
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made it more difficult for forecasters to appreciate the linear relationship that existed between the 
promotional expenditure and the promotional increase. There was also evidence that MAE was 
larger with larger promotions, as Weber’s Law (1934) implies it should be. 
The most surprising finding was the detrimental effects of statistical forecasts. This effect 
has not been found in previous studies. These studies found lack of use or insufficient use of such 
forecasts (e.g., Goodwin & Fildes, 1999; Lim & O'Connor, 1996). In our experiments, statistical 
forecasts increased the overall error and the directional error for normal periods. We hypothesized 
that this was due to the line representing the history of the statistical forecast increasing the 
salience of the mean of the series and so magnifying the anchoring effect. However, results of 
Experiment 2 did not support this.  Experiment 3 showed that reducing the proportion of 
promotions in the historical series significantly lowered the error. Importantly, whereas the 
statistical forecast still had a higher overall and directional error for promotional periods, the 
detrimental effect for normal periods vanished. As very little adjustment away from the series mean 
was needed for normal periods when there are relatively few promotions in the displayed series, 
this implies that the statistical forecast somehow interferes with the adjustment process.   
In our discussion of Experiment 3, we outlined how this interference is likely to occur. 
Unaided forecasters anchor on the mean of the series and adjust upwards when a promotion is 
planned and downwards when none is planned. When the proportion of promotional and normal 
periods in the displayed series is about equal, the required adjustment in these two cases is also 
about equal. Because of anchoring effects, unaided forecasters tend to over-forecast for normal 
periods and under-forecast when promotions are planned. When a statistical forecast is provided 
(based on the ‘uncleaned’ data series), it is usually close to the mean of the series. Hence, 
forecasters who consider such forecasts worth taking into account are influenced by them. This 
influence increases the insufficiency of the already insufficient adjustment away from the mean of 
the series and, as a result, increases the absolute size of the directional error (Figure 7a).  
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We suspect that the increase in overall error when a statistical forecast is provided is largely 
due to this increase in directional error. However, it could also reflect an increase in random error: 
forecasters may be more inconsistent when a statistical forecast is provided because they are faced 
with a conflict: the information in the series suggests that adjustments should be made whereas the 
statistical forecast suggests that they should not.  
 
6.1 Limitations, further research and practical implications 
 
While the findings were broadly robust across experiments and manipulations, replication in 
other situations is needed. The within-participants design that we used does not generally reflect 
what practitioners do. For example, someone making sales forecasts for a set of products is unlikely 
to make use of a statistical forecast for some of them but not others. Thus, it would be useful to 
investigate whether the effects reported here are replicated using a between-participants design.  
Another limitation of this study could be the type of statistical forecast used. Our approach 
was based on that used by the practitioners in the organizations studied by Trapero et al. (2013) and 
Fildes et al. (2009). Those companies used forecasts that did not distinguish between promotional 
and non-promotional periods. However, in the experiment reported by Goodwin and Fildes (1999), 
statistical forecasts were based on time series that had been cleaned of promotional effects. It could 
be that the detrimental effects of the statistical forecasts were due to their inadequacy: they 
provided starting points that were under-forecasts for promotional periods and over-forecasts for 
normal ones.  
It would also be possible to move a step further and provide statistical forecasts for 
promotional periods that take evidence about the promotion function (obtained from past data) into 
account. Promotional modelling has been explored in recent years. Trapero et al. (2013) suggest a 
hybrid model for forecasting promotions that combines judgmental adjustment and transfer 
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function forecasts. Huang, Fildes and Soopramanien (2014) developed a two-stage method, 
involving variable selection and an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model. Most recently, 
Kourentzes and Petropoulos (in press) suggested an extended multivariate Multiple Aggregation 
Prediction Algorithm (MAPA) for forecasting. While these models hold much promise, practice is 
notoriously slow in adapting more advanced formal methods (Lawrence, 2000; Sanders & Manrodt, 
2003). Many organizations lack the necessary expertise and resources to employ sophisticated 
models (Hughes, 2001; Trapero, et al., 2015). Thus, the difficulty here lies not only in the methods 
themselves but also in getting people to use them (Lawrence, 2000). A possible framework is the 
Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989; Davis, Bagozzi, & Warschaw, 1989), which suggests that 
the behavioral intention to use a new system is a combination of perceived usefulness and perceived 
ease of use. Venkatesh and Davis (2000) propose an extension of this model, and suggest a number 
of other influencing factors, including experience, subjective norms, image, job relevance, output 
quality, and the demonstrability of results. 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
Previous research has already established that people make insufficient use of statistical 
forecasts and tend to discount advice from formal models (Goodwin, et al., 2007; Önkal, et al., 
2009). Our study provides an even more cautionary tale: the provision of a statistical model holds 
the potential of producing a worse forecast, compared to unaided judgment, in time series disturbed 
by special events such as promotions. While we should be careful in formulating practical 
conclusions before the finding is tested further, one key take-away of this study would be that 
researchers need to be cautious in viewing the statistical model as being universally better than 
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 Taking account of the effects of promotions: A 
comparison of unaided judgmental forecasting and 




Forecasting from time series subject to sporadic perturbations: Effectiveness of different 




How effective are different approaches to providing forecasting support? In a first 
experiment, forecasters made predictions from time series data (past sales) that were subject to 
sporadic perturbations (promotions).  Some received statistical forecasts that took no account of the 
fact that some past data points were affected by promotions. Others received statistical forecasts 
based on data cleansed of the effects of promotions. Forecasts were made for periods with and 
without planned promotions. Overall accuracy levels in these groups did not differ but both were 
higher than accuracy in a third group that had no forecasting support. All groups showed under-
forecasting on promotional periods but over-forecasting on normal ones. Relative size of these 
biases depended on the proportion of promotions in the data series. Forecasting support helped not 
because it reduced them but because it decreased random error (scatter). In a second experiment, 
forecasters received optimal statistical forecasts that took effects of promotions fully into account. 
Overall accuracy was higher than in the groups that received statistical support in the first 
experiment. This was because biases were almost eliminated and because of a further reduction in 
random error. However, this random error remained high at over 80% of its previous level. 
  






Business forecasters use both pure (i.e. unaided) judgmental forecasting and forecasting 
aided by formal statistical forecasts (Sanders & Manrodt, 2003). The latter approach may be 
increasing as users become more familiar with software that provides forecasting support. As a 
result, forecast support systems have great potential for improving forecast performance. However, 
there are factors that prevent this potential being fully realised. Forecasters tend to ignore the 
‘advice’ provided by a formal forecast or take too little account of it (Goodwin, et al., 2007; Lim & 
O'Connor, 1996; Önkal, et al., 2009). When they do take some account of it, the resulting 
improvements are generally small, albeit somewhat greater when series are complex and the formal 
forecasts are of higher quality (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999; Goodwin, et al., 2011; Lim & O'Connor, 
1995; Trapero, et al., 2013).  
The picture is more complex in the case of series with sporadic perturbations, such as those 
associated with promotions. Goodwin and Fildes (1999) showed that, in this situation, statistical 
forecasts tend to help on normal periods but not on those subject to promotions. However, the 
statistical forecasts used in this research did not take effects of promotions into account: they were 
based on the baseline time series cleansed of the effects of promotions. Recently, forecasting 
models that do allow for the effects of promotions have been developed (Huang, et al., 2014; 
Kourentzes & Petropoulos, in press; Trapero, et al., 2013). However, given that there is considerable 
lag between development of more sophisticated statistical models and their implementation by 
practitioners (Lawrence, 2000; Sanders & Manrodt, 2003), it is  likely to be some time before they 
impact business practice. 
Even in the case of relatively simple models, there appears to be a gap between the formal 
forecasts used in experimental studies and those used in business practice. In experimental studies, 
the formal forecast is based on non-promotional periods only (e.g., Goodwin & Fildes, 1999). In 
other words, the forecast is calculated from the baseline series cleansed of promotion effects. In 
non-experimental studies, on the other hand, formal forecasts take no account of whether past 
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periods contain promotions (Fildes, et al., 2009; Trapero, et al., 2013). Hence, if we are interested in 
the relevance of experimental results to business practice, we need to ask whether any advantage of 
using judgmentally adjusted statistical forecasts over unaided judgment depends on the type of 
statistical forecast used.  
Goodwin and Fildes (1999) have argued that the benefit of providing statistical forecasts 
should be greater when they are based on data that have been cleansed of promotional effects. 
Referring to the estimated level of sales when a promotion does not run as the baseline value, they 
point out that this is because the baseline values provided by that type of statistical forecast can be 
accepted without any adjustment when no promotions are planned. Moreover, past differences 
between promotional and non-promotional periods can be directly used as a basis for assessing the 
size of the adjustment needed when promotions are planned.  
 In what follows, we address the following questions. First, is there an advantage of using a 
judgmentally adjusted statistical forecast over using unaided judgment? Second, is any such 
advantage greater when statistical forecasts are based on past data cleansed of promotional effects? 
Third, does any benefit derived from provision of statistical forecasts depend on features of the data 
series (i.e., ratio of promotional to non-promotional periods) or of the periods to be forecast (i.e., 
whether a promotion is planned)?  Finally, can people make good use of ‘ideal’ statistical forecasts 
that include allowance for the effects of promotions (cf., Huang et al, 2014; Kourentzes and 
Petropoulos, In Press; Trapero et al, 2013)? In other words, do they adopt these forecasts without 
making any adjustment?   
2. Development of hypotheses 
In their survey, Fildes and Goodwin (2007) found that 75% of respondents indicated that 
they used judgment when making forecasts. Of these, 25% said that they used unaided judgment 
and 50% said that they used a combination of judgment and statistical forecasting (averaging, 
judgmental adjustment). Over recent years, use of statistical software has become more pervasive in 
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business settings and so the proportion of forecasters using a combinatorial approach may have 
increased.  
Judgmental adjustment does not always improve statistical forecasts.  People tend to make 
unnecessary adjustments even when they have no additional information (Goodwin, 2000; 
Lawrence, et al., 2006). This may be because they discern patterns in noise (Fildes, et al., 2009), 
because they are too optimistic and place excess weight on positive signals (Bovi, 2009; Durand, 
2003; Kotteman, et al., 1994), or because they want to feel ownership of their forecasts (Önkal & 
Gönul, 2005). They also tend to be overconfident in the accuracy of their forecasts (Arkes, 2001; 
Bovi, 2009; Lawrence, et al., 2006), perhaps because a self-serving attribution bias causes them to 
overestimate the importance of their own judgment relative to that of the statistical forecast (Hilary 
& Hsu, 2011; Libby & Rennekamp, 2012).  
All these studies have focused on whether judgmentally adjusted forecasts are better or 
worse than raw statistical forecasts. The underlying issue was whether forecasters should be 
allowed to make adjustments to statistical forecasts and, if they should, whether anything can be 
done to ensure that their adjustments are beneficial (Goodwin, et al., 2011). In contrast, our primary 
aim here is to investigate the value of providing a formal forecast to increase forecasting accuracy. 
Thus, our focus is on whether judgmentally adjusted statistical forecasts are better or worse than 
unaided judgmental forecasts. For us, the underlying issue is to quantify the benefit of providing 
forecasters with forecasting support systems. These systems have been assumed to be beneficial 
(Alvarado-Valencia & Barrero, 2014) because they reduce the processing demands imposed on 
forecasters (Fildes & Goodwin, 2013). Furthermore, combining forecasts from more than one source 
outperforms the results of a single forecasting method (Armstrong, 2001a), particularly when the 
two methods are independent and rely on different information. Given the complementary nature 
of judgment and statistical methods, their combination should be especially beneficial (Blattberg & 
Hoch, 1990). Therefore: 
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H1: Providing forecasters with statistical forecasts improves forecasting accuracy compared 
to unaided judgment. 
Önkal, Sayim, & Lawrence (2012) noted that some differences exist between the 
characteristics of forecasts examined in experimental research and those prevalent in business 
practice. As mentioned above, one such difference is in the nature of the statistical forecast 
provided when series are subject to perturbations of the sort typically produced by promotions: in 
experimental work, statistical forecasts have been cleansed of promotional effects (Goodwin and 
Fildes, 1999; Goodwin et al, 2011) whereas, in business data analysed by researchers, they have not 
(Fildes, et al., 2009; Trapero, et al., 2013). As we mentioned above, Goodwin and Fildes (1999) 
expected the former approach to produce better results. Specifically, they argued: “This has the 
benefit of clearly separating the underlying time series from the promotion effects. Moreover, some 
commercial forecasting packages like Forecast Pro now allow observations for special periods to be 
separated out so that they cannot contaminate forecasts for normal periods. … With access to a 
statistical time series forecast of the ‘baseline value’ the judge has only to estimate the effect of the 





Figure 1.  Adjustments necessary for a statistical forecast based on non-cleansed series (upper panel) 
and cleansed series (lower panel). 
As an example, consider a promotion of a given size that has elevated sales by 100 units 
above the baseline in the past. If a promotion of the same size is planned for the future, 100 units 
can simply be added to the statistical forecast of the baseline forecast (Figure 1, upper panel). On 
the other hand, if no promotion is planned, the baseline forecast can be adopted without 
adjustment. In contrast, statistical forecasts based on non-cleansed data always have to be adjusted. 
When no promotion is planned, the forecast must be adjusted downwards and, when one is 
planned, it must be adjusted upwards (Figure 1, lower panel).  Forecasters need to know how much 
the statistical forecast has been influenced by the presence of past promotions in the data series. 
Without that knowledge, it is difficult for them to know how much to adjust upwards when 
promotions are planned and how much to adjust downwards when they are not. Thus, the 
forecasting process is more complex than when the statistical forecast is based on cleansed data 
series. 
In fact, few studies have compared the effects of different types of statistical forecast on the 
accuracy of judgmental forecasters provided with those forecasts. One exception is Lim and 
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O’Connor’s (1995) experimental study of forecasting from time series without disturbances. They 
manipulated the accuracy of the statistical forecasts; they varied from low (naïve forecast) to 
medium (damped) to high (average of damped forecast and the actual value). Participants were 
asked to make an initial forecast based on their own judgment and were then presented with one of 
the three types of statistical forecast. After every trial, they were able to see their final forecast, the 
statistical forecast and the actual value, thus facilitating learning over trials. There was an overall 
beneficial effect of providing statistical forecasts, consistent with our first hypothesis. Additionally, 
more accurate statistical forecasts provided greater improvements in accuracy.  
Thus, based on Goodwin and Fildes (1999) reasoning and on Lim and O’Connor’s (1995) 
findings: 
Hypothesis 2: Formal forecasts based on cleansed series are more beneficial than those 
based on non-cleansed series. 
Judgmental forecasting from time series appears to depend on use of anchoring heuristics 
(Lawrence and O’Connor, 1992).  Given an un-trended data series that includes both normal and 
promotional periods, unaided forecasters are likely to anchor on the mean of that series. Then they 
adjust upwards to allow for the presence of a planned promotion in the forecast period and adjust 
downwards to allow for the absence of a planned promotion. Given that adjustment is typically 
insufficient when anchoring heuristics are used (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), we expect under-
forecasting for promotional periods but over-forecasting for normal ones. As statistical forecasts 
based on non-cleansed series follow the mean of the data series, we expect the same mental anchor 
to be used as for unaided forecasting.  Thus, where directional error is given by the outcome minus 
the forecast: 
H3a: For forecasting that is unaided or aided by statistical forecasts based on non-cleansed 
data series, directional error will be positive for normal periods and negative for promotional ones. 
 When statistical forecasts are based on cleansed data series, the mean of the statistical 
forecast history will approximate the mean of the non-promotional periods. Hence, to predict sales 
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for a period when no promotion is planned, forecasters do not need any adjustment. However, for 
promotional periods, they still need to adjust upwards (Figure 1, lower panel) and this adjustment 
will be insufficient. Hence: 
H3a: For forecasting that is aided by statistical forecasts based on cleansed data series, the 
directional error will be zero for normal periods and negative for promotional periods.  
Statistical forecasts based on non-cleansed series tend to lie between the sales level 
associated with non-promotional periods and the average sales level associated with promotional 
periods. When the ratio of promotional to non-promotional periods is low (e.g., 10%), the historical 
mean of statistical forecasts will be much closer to the actual baseline of the series than when it is 
high (e.g., 40%). This should benefit forecasting for periods without promotions as minimal 
adjustment is required. However, when this ratio is low, there is less information on which to 
estimate the relation between promotional size and its effect. This is likely to impair forecasting for 
promotional periods. Thus, when statistical forecasts are based on non-cleansed series: 
H4: A lower proportion of promotions in the data series will benefit forecasts for non-
promotional periods but impair those for promotional periods. 
When there are relatively few promotional periods in the data, statistical forecasts based on 
non-cleansed data series are closer to the baseline and, as a result, they approximate statistical 
forecasts based on cleansed data. In contrast, when the proportion of promotional periods is high, 
statistical forecasts based on non-cleansed series are well above the baseline and the difference 
between them and statistical forecasts based on cleansed-series is larger. Hence: 
Hypothesis 5: Any difference in the benefits derived from the two types of statistical forecast 
will be greater when the proportion of promotional periods in the data series is higher.   
3. Experiment 1 
A mixed design was used to test these hypotheses. Type of task (unaided judgmental 
forecasting/forecasting aided by statistical forecasts based on non-cleansed series/forecasting aided 
by statistical forecasts based on cleansed series) was varied between participants and proportion of 
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promotions in the presented data (40% versus 10%) and forecasting for promotional versus non-
promotional periods were varied within participants. 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants A total of 153 students from University College London participated in the 
study. Their mean age was 18.56 years (SD = 1.03 years) and 127 of them were female. 
3.1.2 Design and stimulus materials   
Forty series, each consisting of 50 data points, were generated with R statistical software. 
Half of the series were independent (mean = 300, error = 7%) and half were autoregressive (mean = 
300, ρ = 0.7, error = 7%). Series were displayed as a grey line and were labelled ‘sales’.  The graphs 
also contained vertical blue bars that indicated promotional expenditure on either five or 20 of the 
50 periods. Both location and size of these promotions were assigned randomly. Promotion size was 
selected at random without replacement from a list of every tenth value between 50 and 200. The 





∗ 	#  
This indicates a same-week percentage increase PI at time t (over the regular sales S at that 
time) equal to one fifth of the promotional expenditure P.  
Participants were asked to forecast one step ahead and two steps ahead. A promotion was 
present either on time period 51 or time period 52. The size of this promotion was randomized for 
every participant across trials. Over the experimental session, it included every tenth value between 
30 and 220. Thus, participants were required to forecast four promotion sizes (30, 40, 210, 220) that 






Figure 2. Experiment 1: Example of the screen display. Unaided judgment (upper panel), aided 
judgment based on cleansed series (middle panel) and based on non-cleansed series (lower panel) 
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The presence and type of statistical forecasts was manipulated between participants. The 
first group (A) did not receive a statistical forecast (Figure 2; Upper panel). Two other groups 
received a statistical forecast calculated using the Holt-Winters exponential smoothing method. A 
line graph represented the statistical forecast history for week 2 to week 52. One of these groups (B) 
received a statistical forecast based on the total sales: in calculating it, no distinction was made 
between normal and promotional periods (Figure 2; Middle panel). The other group (C) received a 
statistical forecast based on the baseline data series, cleansed of promotional effects (Figure 2; 
Lower panel).  
3.1.3. Procedure Participants of group A (unaided judgment, no statistical forecast) were 
given the following text on an instruction sheet: “Please read this document carefully before you 
start with the first graph! In this experiment, you will receive a number of graphs such as the one 
depicted below. On the X-axis, you will find the time period, ranging from 0 to 55. On the Y-axis, you 
will find the sales number, ranging from 0 to 500. The grey line indicates the sales data of a product 
in the past 50 time periods. The blue bars indicate the promotional investment (e.g., an 
advertisement campaign) made for that product. The number of promotions can vary: some graphs 
will have 5 promotions, others will have 20. It is your job to predict the sales number of the following 
two time periods (51 and 52), as accurately as possible. Pay attention, because sometimes there is a 
promotion present and sometimes there isn’t. You can make your prediction by clicking with your 
mouse on the graph. An information box with your mouse’s location appears next to your cursor. 
First click on your prediction for time period 51 and only then for time period 52. Afterwards, a box 
‘next graph’ will appear on the bottom of the page.” 
Participants in group B (statistical forecast based on cleansed series) saw the following 
additional text:  “The orange line is a forecast from a statistical model. The model is based on the 
cleaned sales data: the promotion effects have been taken out of the data until only the baseline 
remained. The model uses these baseline data to produce the statistical forecasts. You can see the 
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predictions it made in the past and what it predicts for time period 51 and 52. You can choose 
whether or not to follow the statistical forecast”.  
For those in group C (statistical forecast based on non-cleansed data), the additional text 
was as follows: “The orange line is a forecast from a statistical model. We have fed the sales data to 
a statistical model. You can see the predictions it made in the past and what it predicts for time 
period 51 and 52. This statistical model is a simple model that ignores whether or not a promotion 
took place: it is just based on the value of the sales figures. You can choose whether or not to follow 
the statistical forecast.” 
In addition, participants were orally instructed to pay close attention to the explanation of 
the graphical components on their instruction sheet and were given a short demonstration of two 
example trials. 
3.2. Results 
We present analyses of three error scores: mean absolute error (MAE), mean error (ME), 
and variable error (VE). 
3.2.1. Mean absolute error. MAE was used to measure overall error level. Errors were 
calculated relative to the ideal forecast. This was provided by the signal (excluding the noise) of the 
time series on non-promotional periods and by the signal plus the promotion effect on promotional 
periods. For the independent time series, the ideal forecast for a non-promotional period was 300 
(the mean). For the autoregressive series, it was 0.2 (1-ρ) of the distance from the last data point 
towards the mean. Outlier analysis indicated two participants had scored more than two standard 
deviations away from the mean on half of the trials or more; they were therefore excluded from the 
analyses. 
Table 1a shows MAE values for each combination of the three independent variables. The 
overall mean value of MAE was 30.20 (SD = 9.65). Table 1b shows the scores of the raw statistical 
forecasts for the different trial types.  
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Table 1a  
Condition Means (MAE) of Promotion Frequency and Presence of Promotion  
Independent Variables Statistical forecast  
None Cleansed Not cleansed Means 
40% promotions Promotion 33.48 30.13 30.24 31.28 
No promotion 35.06 28.66 31.67 31.79 
10% promotions Promotion 34.54 31.11 29.43 31.69 
No promotion 29.94 24.44 23.73 26.03 
Means  33.26 28.59 28.77 30.20 
 
Table 1b  
Error Scores of the Raw Statistical Forecasts according to Promotion Frequency and Presence of 
Promotion  
Independent Variables Cleansed Not cleansed 
MAE SD MAE SD 
40% promotions Promotion 76.04 7.51 52.27 7.51 
No promotion 3.90 0 2.21 0 
10% promotions Promotion 77.14 7.55 68.05 7.98 
No promotion 7.71 0 7.69 0 
 
 
An analysis of variance with statistical forecast as a between-participants variable and 
promotion frequency and promotion presence as within-participant variables revealed a main effect 
of statistical forecast (F (2,150) = 3.99, p = .021, ηp² = .050). Hypothesis 1 stated that the provision of 
a statistical forecast would be beneficial to forecasting accuracy, such that unaided judgment would 
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result in higher error than unaided judgment. One-tailed t-tests confirm that the MAE for the 
unaided judgment group (MAE = 33.25, SD = 9.84) was significantly higher from that of the cleansed 
forecast group (MAE = 28.58, SD = 9.29; t (100) = 2.47, p = .008) and significantly higher than that of 
the non-cleansed forecast (MAE = 28.77, SD = 9.26; t (100) = 2.37, p = .010). 
The MAE scores of the cleansed forecast group and the non-cleansed forecast group were 
not significantly different from one another (t (100) = -.10, p = .921).  Thus we failed to obtain 
support for Hypothesis 2, which stated that participants given a statistical forecast based on 
cleansed series would be more accurate than those given a statistical forecast based on non-
cleansed series.  
There was a main effect of frequency of promotions in the data series (F (2,150) = 28.21, p < 
.001, ηp² = .158), a main effect of the presence of a promotion in the period to be forecast (F (2,150) 
= 7.35, p = .008, ηp² = .047), and an interaction between these two variables (F (2,150) = 743.82, p < 
.001, ηp² = .226). Analysis of simple effects showed that these effects arose because lower error with 
less frequent promotions occurred when forecasts were made for non-promotional periods (F (1, 
150) = 61.66, p < .001) but not when they were made for promotional ones.  
We failed to obtain support for Hypothesis 5: there was no significant interaction between 
the type of statistical forecast provided and frequency of promotions in the data series. 
3.2.2. Mean error MAE is a measure of overall error.  Following Thurstone (1926), we can 
regard overall error as being made up of directional error or bias (ME) and scatter or variable error 
(VE). Taking D as the Actual – Forecast, ME is defined as ΣD/n and VE as √ ([Σ (D – ME)2]/n). Thus, 
overall error could theoretically comprise a) bias but no scatter (all forecasts are a fixed distance 
from the optimal forecast with no distribution around that point), b) scatter but no bias (forecasts 
are distributed around a central point but that central point is the optimal forecast), or c) bias and 
scatter (forecasts are distributed around a central point that is a fixed distance from the optimal 
forecast). In practice, both bias and scatter contribute to overall error but their relative contributions 
depend on contextual factors.  
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To investigate the reasons for the differences in MAE reported above and to test hypothesis 
3 – 5, we report analyses of ME (Table 2) in this section and of VE (Table 3) in the following one.  
 
Table 2  
Condition Means (ME) of Promotion Frequency and Presence of Promotion  
Independent Variables Statistical forecast  
None Cleansed Not cleansed Mean 
40% promotions Promotion -8.07 -6.47 -3.85 -6.13 
No promotion 18.21 14.08 18.38 16.89 
10% promotions Promotion -10.93 -11.39 -7.04 -9.79 
No promotion 12.63 8.07 9.84 10.18 
Means  2.96 1.07 4.33 2.79 
 
Table 3  
Means of Promotion Frequency and Presence of Promotion for the three Conditions for Variable Error 
(VE) 
Independent Variables Statistical forecast  
None Cleansed Not cleansed Mean 
40% promotions Promotion 7.72 7.15 7.05 7.31 
No promotion 7.02 6.63 6.78 6.81 
10% promotions Promotion 7.60 6.86 6.73 7.06 
No promotion 7.02 6.27 5.62 6.30 




There was a main effect of whether the forecast was for a period with or without 
promotions (F (2,150) = 126.69, p < .001, ηp² = .458). Mean Error was negative when forecasts were 
for periods on which promotions were planned but positive when they were for periods with no 
promotions planned. There was also a main effect of the proportion of promotions in the data series 
(F (2,150) = 67.17, p < .001, ηp² = .309): overall, ME was lower when there was a low proportion of 
promotions in the data series than when there was a high one.  There was also a significant 
interaction between these two variables (F (2,150) = 6.49, p = .012, ηp² = .041). Analysis of simple 
effects showed that this arose because a lower proportion of promotions in the data series 
decreased the positive ME of forecasts for non-promotional periods (F (1, 150) = 63.77, p < .001) but 
increased the negative ME of forecasts for promotional periods (F (1, 150) = 16.54, p < .001). This 
result is consistent with Hypothesis 4 that stated that fewer promotions would benefit forecasts for 
non-promotional periods but impair those for promotional ones. 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that, when the statistical forecast was based on non-cleansed 
series, under-forecasting for promotional periods would occur, and over-forecasting for normal 
periods. One-sample t-tests confirmed that ME was significantly below zero on promotional periods 
(t (50) = -2.27, p = .028) and significantly above zero (t (50) = 8.20, p < .001) on normal ones.  
Hypothesis 3b predicted that, for the forecasts based on cleansed series, the ME for normal 
periods would be zero and the ME for promotional periods would be negative (i.e., under-
forecasting). While the ME for promotional periods in the cleansed series condition was indeed 
significantly below zero (t (50) = -3.51, p = .001), the ME for normal periods was positive and 
significantly different from zero (t (50) = 7.37, p < .001). This over-forecasting on normal periods was 
greater when there were 40% promotions in the data series than when there were 10% promotion 
in the data series (t (50) = 4.25, p < .001).  
3.2.3. Variable Error. There was a significant effect of group on VE (F (2,150) = 3.10, p = .048). 
We hypothesized that the error of the unaided judgment group would be higher than that of the 
aided judgment groups. One tailed t-tests confirm that the VE of unaided judgment group was 
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indeed larger than that of the group who received cleansed forecasts (t (100) = 1.98, p = .025), and 
that of the group that received cleansed forecasts (t (100) = 2.34, p = .011). (VE scores in the latter 
two groups were not significantly different from one another.) 
Forecasts from data series with 40% promotions had higher VE scores than those from data 
series with 10% promotions (F (1,150) = 7.38, p = .007, ηp² = .047). In addition, forecasts for 
promotional periods had higher VE than those for non-promotional ones (F (1,150) = 17.98, p < .001, 
ηp² = .107).  
3.3. Discussion 
The experiment produced two separate groups of effects. The first concerns the effects on 
MAE and VE of whether participants made unaided forecasts, made forecasts after being given non-
cleansed statistical forecasts, or made forecasts after being given cleansed statistical forecasts. The 
second concerns effects on MAE, ME, and VE of the proportion of promotional periods in the data 
series and of whether forecasts were made for promotional or normal periods. As there were no 
interactions between these two groups of effects, we will discuss them separately. Once we have 
done so, we will summarise a unitary account of the cognitive processes underlying performance 
that explains both types of effect. 
3.3.1. Effects of providing forecast support 
Provision of statistical forecasts reduced overall error (MAE). However, further analysis 
showed that this was not because they reduced the directional error or bias (ME) in forecasts. 
Instead, it was because they reduced random error or scatter (VE): they made forecasts more 
consistent.  
We anticipated that the cleansed statistical forecasts would improve forecasting more than 
the non-cleansed ones. However, our rationale for this was based on our expectation that the 
cleansed forecasts would lower bias by reducing the under-adjustment from the mean of the series 
– the salient anchor in the unaided and non-cleansed statistical forecast conditions. It was on this 
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basis that we generated hypotheses 2, 3a, and 5. However, no differences in the effectiveness of the 
cleansed and non-cleansed statistical forecasts were evident, either as main effects or as 
interactions in our analyses of MAE, ME and VE. They did not affect degree of under-adjustment 
from the mean of the series. 
Provision of cleansed and of non-cleansed statistical hypotheses both improved overall 
accuracy but there was no difference in the degree to which they did so. This was because there was 
no difference in the extent to which they reduced VE.  
3.3.2. Effects of promotions in the data series and in the periods to be forecast 
Proportion of promotions in the data series and whether the forecast was for a normal or for 
a promotional period interacted in their effects on overall forecast accuracy (Table 1): a greater 
proportion of non-promotional periods in the data specifically helped forecasts for non-promotional 
periods. To understand why this was, we need to consider the separate analyses of ME and VE. 
Forecasters are likely to anchor on the overall mean of the data series (Lawrence and 
O’Connor, 1992).  Fewer promotions meant that that overall mean was closer to the mean value of 
the non-promotional periods but further from the mean value of the promotional periods. So, with 
fewer promotions in the data series, a larger adjustment from the overall mean of the series was 
needed to forecast promotional periods but a smaller adjustment was needed to forecast non-
promotional periods. The data show that under-adjustment was greater when a larger adjustment 
was needed. This is to be expected. In psychophysics, the Weber-Fechner Law (Baird and Noma, 
1978; Fechner, 1860; Weber, 1834) summarizes many findings showing that errors in discrimination 
are proportional to the overall size of the stimulus being judged. Hence, because under-adjustment 
was proportional to the size of the required adjustment, ME became less positive on normal periods 
but more negative on promotional ones as the proportion of promotions in the data series 
decreased (Table 2).  
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A greater proportion of promotions in the data series increased its variability. If people used 
their estimate of the overall mean of the series as a judgment anchor, this estimate would have 
been more variable when the proportion of promotions in the data series was higher. As a result, VE 
was also higher (Table 3).  
To allow for the absence or presence of a promotion in the period to be forecast, people 
would have had to adjust away from this initial judgment anchor. When there was no promotion 
planned, this would require forecasters merely to estimate from the data series the mean value of 
sales when no promotion had occurred (and to move their judgment away from the initial anchor 
towards that mean value). However, when a promotion was planned, they would have to do more 
than just estimate the mean value of sales when a promotion occurred: they would also have to take 
into account the relation between the size of a promotion and the elevating effect it had on sales. 
This could be done in various ways (e.g., via some kind of mental regression). However, it is 
reasonable to assume that this additional process would be imperfect and so add some random 
error to the forecasts. As a result, VE was higher in forecasts for promotional periods (Table 3). 
The reasons for the relatively low value of MAE when forecasts for normal (rather than 
promotional) periods were made from series with 10% (rather than 40%) promotions are now clear. 
VE is reduced by forecasting for normal rather than for promotional periods. Additionally, VE is 
reduced with fewer promotions in the data series. Finally, fewer promotions in the data also result in 
a reduction of the size of the positive ME associated with forecasts that are made for normal 
periods. This combination of two factors reducing VE (normal periods, fewer promotions) and one 
factor reducing ME (fewer promotions) results in a particularly low MAE value. MAE is higher in all 
other cases because factors that lower VE and those that lower ME do not combine in the same 
felicitous manner. For example, consider the case in which forecasts are made for a promotional 
period from data series containing 40% promotions. Here, the higher proportion of promotions in 
the data series reduces the size of the negative ME associated with making forecasts for promotional 
periods. However the beneficial effects of this are counteracted by the fact that VE is higher when 
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forecasts are made for promotional periods and when the proportion of promotions in the data 
series is higher.  
Why did the presence of a statistical forecast lower VE and, hence, MAE? We have argued 
that forecasters first estimate the overall mean of the data series and that this acts as an initial 
judgment anchor. Furthermore, this is an error-prone process: VE is higher when the data series is 
more variable. Both types of statistical forecast act to make it less error-prone. Forecasters could 
reduce the amount of random error in their estimate of the series mean simply by averaging it with 
the non-cleansed statistical forecast or by averaging it with the cleansed statistical forecast plus 
some increment specific to the proportion of promotions in the data series. 
3.3.3. Summary  
In summary, we can explain all the patterns in the data by assuming that people produce 
their forecast in two steps. First, they estimate the overall mean of the data series in order to use it 
as an initial judgment anchor. The size of the random error associated with this estimate is higher 
when data series are more variable but it can be reduced by provision of a statistical forecast. 
Second, forecasters adjust away from this initial anchor to allow for whether a promotion is planned 
or not. Under-adjustment results in under-forecasting on promotional periods and over-forecasting 
on normal ones. The size of the under-adjustment is greater when a larger adjustment is required: 
hence, a greater proportion of promotions in the data series results in greater (positive) ME on 
normal periods but smaller (negative) ME on promotional periods. Adjustments are based on just 
the mean value of sales on non-promotional periods when normal periods are forecast but they 
must take into account the relation between size of promotions and the size of their effects on 






4. Experiment 2 
 Unexpectedly, Experiment 1 failed to reveal any difference in forecast accuracy between 
participants who received the cleansed statistical forecasts and those who received the non-
cleansed ones. Non-cleansed statistical forecasts are cruder: they require less processing of the data 
series but always require some adjustment. In contrast, cleansed forecasts provide a clearly defined 
baseline series and, as a result, they can be accepted without adjustment for non-promotional 
periods. Despite this, participants made large upward adjustments on these periods (Table 2).  
It is possible that people who see that the cleansed statistical forecast does not account for 
promotions falsely infer that cannot be ‘trusted’ for normal periods either. As a result, they make 
adjustments for both types of period.  Forecasts need to be relevant, justifiable and valuable in 
dealing with future uncertainties in order for them to be acceptable (Gönül, et al., 2006). The clear 
unacceptability of the cleansed statistical forecasts on promotional periods may have been 
inappropriately generalized to affect the acceptability of those forecasts for both types of period 
(promotional and normal).  
This possibility prompted us to carry out Experiment 2. We provided participants with 
‘optimal’ forecasts. Each forecast for a promotional period was based on the cleansed statistical 
forecasts but with the appropriate increase in sales produced by the promotion in the promotional 
period added to it. While it is not completely realistic to obtain such forecasts in business practice, it 
is an approach that is now approximated by recently developed forecasting methods that include 
promotional modelling (e.g., Huang, et al., 2014; Kourentzes & Petropoulos, in press; Trapero, et al., 
2013). 
We suggested above that cleansed forecasts for non-promotional periods are not accepted 
without adjustment because it is clear to forecasters that cleansed forecasts for promotional periods 
are unacceptable without adjustment and this leads to a lack of trust in all forecasts. As a result, all 
forecasts are adjusted. In the present experiment, it was made clear to forecasters that forecasts for 
promotional as well as for normal periods were acceptable without adjustment. If our suggestion is 
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correct, then forecasters would have no reason not to trust the statistical forecasts. As a result, they 




The experiment was identical to Experiment 1, except that statistical forecasts for 
promotional periods were elevated by an amount that was appropriate to the size of the planned 
promotion. 
4.1.1. Participants Fifty students from University College participated in the study. Their 
mean age was 17.77 years (SD = 0.87 years) and 40 of them were female. 
4.1.2. Stimulus materials, design and procedure In the instructions and in the experiment, 
the statistical forecasts were presented as shown in Figure 3. In all other respects, the experiment 
was identical to the first one. The instructions with regard to the statistical forecast were adapted as 
follows: “The orange line is a forecast from a statistical model. The model is based on the cleaned 
sales data: the promotion effects have been taken out of the data until only the baseline remained. 
The model uses these baseline data to produce the statistical forecasts and then adds the promotion 
effects on top of this forecast. You can see the predictions it made in the past and what it predicts for 




Figure 3. Experiment 2: Example of the screen display. 
4.2. Results 
Data for MAE, ME, and VE of forecasts for periods with and without promotions and from 
data series with low and high frequency of promotions are shown in Table 4. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA of the MAE revealed a main effect of the frequency of promotions (F (1, 49) = 30.15, p < 
.001), indicating that forecasts were more accurate with fewer promotions in the data series, and a 
main effect of presence of a promotion in the period to be forecast (F (1, 49) = 18.62, p < .001), 
showing that forecasts were more accurate for normal than for promotional periods. Analysis of ME 
revealed only a main effect of the frequency of promotions (F (1, 49) = 26.03, p < .001) indicating 
slight over-forecasting when data series contained 40% promotional periods but slight under-
forecasting when they contained 10% promotional periods. The Variable Error indicated a main 
effect of the frequency of promotions (F (1, 49) = 11.37, p = .001) and a main effect of the presence 
of a promotion (F (1, 49) = 9.53, p = .003). The direction of these effects mirrored that of those 
obtained for MAE. 
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Table 4  
Condition Means (MAE and ME) of Promotion Frequency and Presence of Promotion  
Independent Variables MAE ME VE 
40% promotions Promotion 25.61 1.99 6.28 
No promotion 23.09 2.54 5.74 
10% promotions Promotion 23.02 -2.8 5.70 
No promotion 19.50 -.59 5.19 




Figure 4. Error scores associated with different forecasting conditions studied in the two experiments: 





























Unaided Judgment Statistical forecast -
cleansed




High frequency, Promotion High frequency, No promotion
Low frequency, Promotion Low Frequency, No promotion
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4.2.1. Comparison of performance with that obtained in Experiment 1 
Did the enhanced statistical forecast provided in this experiment lead to better forecasting 
than that obtained by using unaided judgment or by using judgment aided by the provision of other 
types of statistical forecast? To find out, we compared forecast accuracy with that obtained in the 
three conditions of Experiment 1 (Figure 4). With regard to overall error (MAE), performance was 
significantly better than unaided judgment (F (1, 99) = 27.77, p < .001), aided judgment with a non-
cleansed-series statistical forecast (F (1, 99) = 14.71, p < .001) and aided judgment with a cleansed-
series forecast (F (1, 99) = 23.13, p < .001).  
To compare the size of ME scores across experiments, we analyzed their absolute values. As 
hypothesized, those in the present experiment were lower than those in all conditions of the 
previous experiment: unaided judgment (t (58) = -6.12, p < .001); judgment aided with non-cleansed 
statistical forecasts (t (63) = -5.46, p < .001): judgment aided with cleansed statistical forecasts (t (60) 
= -4.56, p < .001)1. Similarly, the VE was significantly lower in the current experiment than it was in 
all conditions of the previous experiment: unaided judgment (t (77) = -6.84, p < .001), judgment 
aided with a non-cleansed statistical forecasts (t (67) = -2.81, p = .003); judgment aided with 
cleansed statistical forecasts (t (73) = -3.93, p < .001)4.  
4.3. Discussion 
Provision of optimal statistical forecasts significantly reduced all types of error relative to the 
corresponding error levels observed in all conditions of Experiment 1. In particular, the absolute size 
of the directional error reduced very considerably. This implies that under-adjustment from the 
initial anchor was strongly attenuated. However, MAE scores show that a fair amount of error still 
persisted (Figure 4). This was primarily driven by VE. Although this type of error was significantly 
lower than it was in all the conditions of Experiment 1, it remained high at 83% of its size in that 
                                                            
4 In cross-experimental comparisons of ME and VE, Levene’s test indicated unequal variances and so degrees 
of freedom were adjusted accordingly. 
122 
 
experiment. As before, it was larger when there were more promotions in the data series and when 
promotions were planned for a forecast period. These influences on VE are likely to explain their re-
appearance in the analyses of MAE. 
Lim and O’Connor (1995, Experiment 3) obtained similar findings to ours. They found that 
forecasters made insufficient use of near-perfect statistical forecasts that were generated by taking 
the average of a highly reliable statistical forecast and the actual outcome. Forecasters put too much 
weight on their own views and not enough on the statistical forecast. Similarly, Gardner and Berry 
(1995) found that people performing a control task who were freely offered perfectly correct advice 
decided to obtain it on only 44% of occasions. Furthermore, those who obtained it acted in 
accordance with it on only 73% of occasions. One interpretation of both of these results is that 
people tend to be overconfident in their own abilities. As a result, they do not take sufficient 
account of good advice.  
According to the account that we provided of the results from Experiment 1, forecasts are 
produced in two stages. First, forecasters (even those who are provided with statistical forecasts) 
make their own assessment of the mean of the data series to use as an initial judgment anchor. This 
assessment is subject to random error that is reflected in the VE scores. This random error is greater 
when data series are more variable. They are more variable when they contain a higher proportion 
of promotions and, hence, VE is greater when the proportion of promotions in the data series is 
higher. This same effect was found in the present experiment and so it is reasonable to assume that 
forecasters initially processed the series in a similar way in the present experiment.  
The statistical forecasts examined in Experiment 1 were beneficial because they reduced VE.  
The statistical forecasts used in the present experiment also reduced VE. We suggested that this 
reduction occurs because forecasters can obtain estimates of the series mean both from the raw 
data series and from the series of past statistical forecasts. (Unaided judgmental forecasters can use 
only the data series.) A weighted average of these two estimates then provides the initial judgment 
anchor. If people are less confident in the statistical forecasts, they may put insufficient weight on 
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the estimate obtained from them. As a result, VE may be reduced but not by as much as it could be.  
In the present experiment, the reduction in VE was greater than that produced by the statistical 
forecasts provided in Experiment 1. This may have been because the description of how statistical 
forecasts were generated provided in the instructions gave forecasters greater confidence in them: 
as a result, they put more weight on them and thereby generated a more accurate estimate of the 
series mean to use as an initial judgment anchor. 
In the second stage, forecasters adjust away from the initial judgment anchor to take 
account of the presence or absence of a promotion in the period to be forecast. We saw in 
Experiment 1 that adjustment is typically insufficient (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). As a result, 
promotional periods are under-forecast whereas normal periods are over-forecast.  Adjustments for 
normal periods are based just on the mean value of normal periods in the data series but those for 
promotional periods have to take account of the relation between the size of promotions and the 
elevation in sales that they produce. This additional process is error-prone and therefore increases 
VE of forecasts for promotional periods relative to forecasts for normal periods.  
This same effect (higher VE on promotional periods) was found in the present experiment. 
However, in contrast to Experiment 1, analyses of ME showed that there was no evidence of under-
forecasting on promotional periods or of over-forecasting on normal ones. Thus, including an 
element allowing for promotions in statistical forecasts is beneficial not just because it reduces VE 
but also because it reduces the absolute size of ME. However, VE was still higher for forecasts for 
promotional periods than for those for normal ones. This implies that people do not merely accept 
the statistical forecast. Their low ME scores show that, on average, the mean value of their forecasts 
for both normal and promotional periods is very close to those provided by the statistical forecasts. 
However, there is considerable scatter around these mean values and this scatter is greater for 
forecasts for promotional periods. We attribute this greater scatter to additional error-prone 
cognitive processing that is needed to allow for the promotion function (i.e., the relation between 
promotion size and its effect).  
124 
 
Statistical forecasts that include an element to allow for the effects of promotions are 
beneficial because they reduce both bias and random error in forecasts. However, forecasters do not 
accept them automatically. This is clear not just from the high levels of VE that persist when 
statistical forecasts are provided but also from the fact that VE levels are affected by variables 
concerned with the nature of both the data series (proportion of promotions) and the periods to be 
forecast (normal or promotional). Furthermore, because the way that VE levels are affected by these 
variables when statistical forecasts (of whatever type) are provided is the same as the way in which 
they are affected in unaided judgmental forecasting, our view is that the provision of statistical 
forecasts does not fundamentally alter the cognitive processes that forecasters employ to perform 
their task. Instead, they facilitate these processes and do so more for some of them (e.g., the ‘de-
biasing’ observed in Experiment 2) than for others (e.g., extracting an initial mental anchor from the 
data series).  In other words, forecasters still used an anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic when 
given optimal statistical forecasts but their estimate of the appropriate anchor is somewhat more 
consistent and their adjustment from that anchor is almost free of bias. 
5. General discussion 
We provided forecasters with different types of statistical forecast to investigate how 
effective they are in improving forecasters’ accuracy. We also varied the type of period to be 
forecast and the proportion of promotional periods in the data series because we expected these 
factors to influence the benefits that statistical forecasts bestow on forecasting performance. Finally, 
we developed an account of how forecasts are made from time series that are perturbed by sporadic 
events (i.e. promotions) and of how those forecasts are affected when forecasters have access to 
statistical forecasts.  Here we discuss each of these aspects of our work in turn. All conclusions on 




Table 5  
Comparison of findings on MAE, ME and VE across factors 
 MAE ME VE 
Unaided judgment compared to 
aided judgment 
 
Higher No significant 
difference 
Higher 
Cleansed statistical forecast 









Optimal statistical forecast 
compared to suboptimal 
statistical forecast  
 
Lower Lower Lower 
Promotions compared to 
normal periods 
Higher Higher Higher 
10% compared to 40% 
promotions 





Lower for normal 
periods; higher for 
promotional 
periods 





5.1. Effects of statistical forecasts on forecast accuracy 
Statistical forecasts that take no account of whether periods in the data series were affected 
by sporadic events, such as promotions, provide the most common form of forecasting support for 
practitioners (e.g., Fildes, et al., 2009; Trapero, et al., 2013). However, in experimental research (e.g., 
Goodwin and Fildes, 1999; Goodwin et al, 2011), researchers have investigated the usefulness of 
statistical forecasts based only on normal periods not subject to promotions. We expected that the 
latter approach would be more effective in improving forecasting accuracy (Hypothesis 2). 
While both of these types of statistical forecast improved accuracy relative to that observed 
with unaided judgmental forecasting (Hypothesis 1), there was no difference in the degree to which 
they did so. Given previous work by Lim and O’Connor (1995) and the persuasiveness of the 
arguments in favour of using statistical forecasts based on cleansed data series, this finding was 
unexpected. However, the rationale for Hyporthesis 2 was based on the assumption that statistical 
forecasts reduce bias: we anticipated that the anchoring bias for normal periods would be removed 
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when statistical forecasts are based on cleansed rather than uncleansed series. In fact, our data 
show that statistical forecasts were effective because they reduced scatter (VE) rather than bias 
(ME) and there is no reason to expect scatter to be reduced more by statisical forecasts based on 
cleansed series than by statistical forecasts based on non-cleansed data series. 
It appears that statistical forecasts that are clearly inadequate for promotional periods affect 
the degree to which forecasters feel able to trust them for normal periods (even when they are, in 
fact, optimal for those periods). We reasoned that statistical forecasts that are optimal for both 
promotional and normal periods should be seen as trustworthy and therefore be capable of 
reducing the anchoring biases. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this was so: ME values very close to 
zero showed that anchoring biases were virtually eliminated. However, VE values remained high at 
83% of the level observed in the aided conditions of Experiment 1. Nevertheless, the marked drop in 
overall error (MAE) levels indicates that efforts to incorporate promotional effects into statistical 
forecasts (e.g., Huang, et al., 2014; Kourentzes & Petropoulos, in press; Trapero, et al., 2013) hold 
great promise for increasing the effectiveness of forecasting support systems. 
 
5.2. Effects of promotions in the periods to be forecast 
We expected participants to anchor on the mean level of the data series and to adjust 
upwards/downwards from this to take account of the presence/absence of a promotion planned for 
the forecast period. As adjustment is typically insufficient (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), we 
expected under-forecasting on promotional periods but over-forecasting on normal ones when 
forecasting was unaided or supported by a statistical forecast based on non-cleansed data series 
(Hypothesis 3a). This is indeed what we found, thereby confirming forecasters use of the anchoring 
heuristic. We expected that this anchoring bias would not be present on normal periods when 
statistical forecasts were based on cleansed data series as forecasters would realise that the 
statistical forecast could be accepted without adjustment (Hypothesis 3b). However, as we discussed 
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in the previous section, these forecasts appear not to have been trusted (perhaps because those for 
promotional periods obviously needed adjustment). Forecasters continued to use the mean of the 
series as a judgment anchor and adjust down from it (insufficiently) to make forecasts for normal 
periods. Hence, over-forecasting for those periods persisted. 
5.3. Effects of proportion of promotions in the data series 
We expected that a lower proportion of promotional periods in the data series would reduce 
overall forecasting error on normal periods but increase it on promotional ones (Hypothesis 4). In 
fact, lowering the proportion of promotions resulted in a lower MAE on normal periods but 
promotional ones were unaffected. Decomposing overall error showed why this was so. On 
promotional periods, the absolute size of the under-forecasting bias increased when the proportion 
of promotions in the data series was reduced but scatter decreased. These two effects cancelled one 
another out and so there was no resultant effect on overall error. (For normal periods, reducing the 
proportion of promotions in the data series decreased both the over-forecasting bias and scatter: 
hence, the predicted effect occurred.)  
When there were fewer promotional periods in the data series, statistical forecasts derived 
from non-cleansed series were closer to the baseline forecasts provided by the statistical forecasts 
derived from cleansed data series.  Hence we expected any accuracy advantage of the statistical 
forecasts based on cleansed series (over the statistical forecasts based on non-cleansed series) 
would be greater when the proportion of promotions in the data series was higher (Hypothesis 5). 
However, there was no evidence of an interaction between proportion of promotions in the data 
series and type of statistical forecast. As we have seen, forecasters in Experiment 1 appear to have 
made their judgments in a similar way whether they were unaided or supported by either type of 
statistical forecast.  The only reason that statistical forecasts helped was that they enabled them to 




5.4. Forecasting from time series subject to sporadic perturbation 
We have suggested that the cognitive processes underlying forecasting from time series 
subject to sporadic perturbation are broadly the same whether or not forecasting is aided by 
provision of statistical forecasts.  This is particularly true for the two types of statistical forecast in 
current use: those that take no account of whether periods in the data series are normal or 
promotional and those that are based only on the normal periods. As Experiment 1 showed, 
anchoring effects and effects of proportion of promotions in the data series were unaffected by the 
presence of a statistical forecast or by its type when present. This implies that the way that the 
judgments were made was the same across all conditions of Experiment 1. The provision of 
statistical forecasts did improve accuracy but this was because they made judgment processes more 
consistent rather than because they changed the nature of those processes.  
The optimal statistical forecasts provided in Experiment 2 virtually eliminated under-
adjustment.  However, VE values remained high. Furthermore, they were still affected by variables 
that affected VE in Experiment 1. We suspect that similar cognitive processes were responsible for 
performance in the two experiments.  A mental anchor based on the mean of the data series was 
first extracted. This process was based on noisier data when the series contained more promotions, 
thereby explaining the effect of that variable on VE. The optimal forecasts ensured that, on average, 
the adjustments from this anchor were appropriate. However, VE was still higher when forecasts 
had to be made for promotional periods. To us, this implies that the adjustment process was more 
complex on promotional periods than on normal ones (because of the additional processing stage 
involved in extracting and using the relation between the size of a promotion and the effect that it 
had). Clearly, optimal statistical forecasts are not accepted automatically. They influence judgment 
but do not supersede it.  
Why was there a considerable level of variable error, regardless of the presence and type of 
statistical forecast? Human forecasters introduce inconsistency or random error into forecasts. At 
least in part, this error is likely to arise from the noise that is inherent in cognitive processing. Since 
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Thurstone (1926), it has been known that judgment contains a random element. When people make 
a series of judgments about a criterion variable (e.g., salary levels of a number of different people) 
from information they are given about cue variables imperfectly correlated with the criterion (e.g., 
the weight, age, and nationality of those people), the relation between their judgment and the cues 
contains a random element (Brehmer, 1978) that decreases but does not disappear with practice 
and feedback. There are many hypotheses about why this occurs (Harvey, 1995). For example, 
Hammond and Summers (1972) referred to a failure of cognitive control: just as hand tremor causes 
inconsistency in the execution of fine motor skills, so some analogous process is affects judgment. 
Modern computational modelling of cognition is based on the notion that each component process 
contributes some random error to the total observed in the data (Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011). 
 Noise inherent in cognitive processing is unlikely to be the only reason for high VE levels. 
Lawrence et al (2006, p 501) suggest that small damaging adjustments of the sort reported by Fildes 
et al (2009) may reflect “a tendency to tinker at the edges”. In other words, forecasters intend to 
introduce these small changes that do not, overall, lead to (greater) over-forecasting or under-
forecasting but do increase scatter. But why would forecasters do this?  
There are various possibilities. One is that the changes that they make provide them with a 
way in which to assert their ‘ownership’ of the forecasts (Önkal & Gönul, 2005). Another concerns 
people’s responses to automation. Whenever tasks become partially automated, concerns tend to 
arise among those responsible for performing them that they risk becoming de-skilled (Bainbridge, 
1983). Without feedback about the effects of their own actions, they will not be able to acquire or 
maintain the abilities that they need to perform their tasks autonomously (something that may be 
needed if the automated system suddenly becomes unavailable). Hence, to ensure they receive such 
feedback, operators may occasionally over-rule or interfere with the output produced by the 
automatic system. (For forecasters, receiving feedback about statistical forecasts is no substitute for 
receiving it about the forecasts that they have generated themselves: only in the latter case is the 
rationale for the forecasts known.)  
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5.5. Practical implications 
Our main message for practitioners is that the provision of statistical forecasts reduces 
forecast error but whether those statistical forecasts are based on data cleansed of promotional 
effects does not matter. This knowledge could save time and money because it implies that 
cleansing the data (which in itself is subject to biases; Webby, et al., 2005) is unnecessary. Even a 
relatively simple statistical forecast can be of value for a company. Hence, companies that wish to 
improve their forecasting accuracy but do not currently have a large budget or manpower to spare 
can still benefit from a simple approach that requires minimal effort.  
The results of the second experiment demonstrated that highly sophisticated statistical 
forecasts that explicitly take account of the effects of promotions benefit forecasters considerably 
more than those that do not. Efforts made to develop ways of producing such forecasts (e.g., Huang, 
et al., 2014; Kourentzes & Petropoulos, in press; Trapero, et al., 2013) are clearly worthwhile.  
However, this second experiment also showed that even forecasters who are given optimal 
statistical forecasts make adjustments that impair accuracy. As we have seen, there are different 
ways of explaining this finding but they all imply that, for one reason or another, forecasters are not 
good at taking ‘advice’ from a statistical model. Such discounting of advice has been reported before 
(e.g., Goodwin, 2000; Lim & O'Connor, 1995) and factors that have been proposed to account for it 
include concerns about the credibility of a statistical model rather than a human being as a source of 
advice (Önkal, et al., 2008; Önkal, et al., 2009), and people’s beliefs that their own opinions are 
better founded than those of others (Harvey & Harries, 2004).  
Preventing damaging adjustments has been an important topic in judgmental forecasting. 
Goodwin et al. (2011) found that neither restriction nor guidance improved accuracy. Indeed 
guidance was met with resistance by forecasters. Such resistance is consistent with Bainbridge’s 
(1983) views about responses to automation. However, as we pointed out, reasons that forecasters 
make damaging adjustments may not be purely volitional (i.e., arising because, for one reason or 
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another, they want to make those adjustments) but may also be at least partly cognitive (i.e., noise 
may be inherent in the cognitive processes that underlie forecasting).  
5.6. Limitations 
Our study is potentially subject to limitations. The first of these, use of student participants, 
appears to be straightforward. It could be argued that experts have more insight into how statistical 
forecasts should be used. However, previous work has shown that experts are subject to similar 
errors in reasoning as those that afflict novices. Indeed, in some cases, it has even revealed inverse 
expertise effects (Önkal & Muradoǧlu, 1994; Yates, McDaniel, & Brown, 1991). Advice discounting 
may be even greater in experts because they value their own opinion even more than novices do. In 
fact, Önkal and Muradoǧlu (1994) demonstrated that experts exhibited even more over-confidence 
in their forecasts than those who were less expert. This situation is typical of what happens when 
experience at a task (e.g., forecasting) fails to produce learning as quickly as people expect it to 
(Harvey and Fischer, 2005).  
An experiment is a simulation or model of a task performed by practitioners. As with any 
model, some features of the real world task are excluded. Thus we do not expect to see all 
characteristics of practitioner performance reflected in experimental results. Analysis of data 
obtained from organizations has revealed that forecasters are often subject to optimism effects: 
inappropriate upward adjustments of statistical forecasts are greater or made more often than 
inappropriate downward ones (e.g., Fildes et al, 2009). We did not observe such optimism in our 
experiments. They were not designed to study or reveal it. All the same, it is possible to argue that 
optimism would have produced less under-forecasting on promotional periods than over-forecasting 
on normal periods. We did not find this pattern in the data. However, this prediction does not 
compare like with like. As we have emphasized, processes underlying forecasting on promotional 
periods are different from those that underlie it on normal ones. To research into optimism 
experimentally, studies should be specifically designed with that aim in mind. One approach is to 
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compare two groups performing exactly the same forecasting task but to label the variable being 
forecast as ‘profits’ in one case but ‘losses’ in the other. Forecasts are systematically higher in the 
former case (Harvey and Reimers, 2013).  
5.7. Conclusions 
Provision of statistical forecasts, even crude ones, can improve forecasting accuracy by reducing 
variable error. When forecasts are made from time series perturbed by sporadic exogenous events, 
the effort needed to produce forecasts cleansed of their effects appears not be warranted. However, 
current efforts to develop methods to incorporate effects of these events into statistical forecasts 
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1. General conclusions 
 
This doctoral thesis set out to investigate the benefits of combining judgmental and 
statistical forecasting. When does judgment add value on top of statistical models? Or vice versa, 
when does a statistical model add value when combined with unaided judgment? Can we provide a 
forecast support system to increase the accuracy of this combination of judgment and statistics? 
This thesis focussed specifically on forecasts disturbed by external events (promotions). This type of 
time series is especially relevant for the combination of judgment with statistical methods. Statistical 
methods are known for their consistency and ability to handle large amounts of data (Blattberg & 
Hoch, 1990; Hoch & Schkade, 1996). Yet, they cannot deal well with exogenous events (Armstrong & 
Collopy, 1998; Goodwin, 2002; Hughes, 2001; Taleb, 2007). A forecaster’s judgment can provide 
valuable information in addition to the system forecast: its strengths lie in the interpretation of data, 
the detection of unusual events and the integration of non-quantifiable information. However, 
judgment is notoriously double-sided: it has a much wider application range than a statistical 
forecast, but it is also heavily subject to bias (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). To dig 
deeper into the circumstances surrounding judgmental forecasting in time series with disturbances, 
this doctoral thesis investigated the issue by means of two different methods.  
The first involved employing a dataset from a publishing company, with real forecasts made 
by expert forecasters. Our first research objective was to design a forecast support system that can 
improve on judgmentally adjusted forecasts. Importantly, this system had to increase accuracy while 
simultaneously allowing judgmental input. Why was the latter so important? Goodwin, et al. (2011) 
tested a forecast support system which was based on restriction. Based on the finding that small 
adjustments tend to be damaging (a result replicated in the first study of this thesis; Fildes, et al., 
2009), they designed the forecast support system so that small adjustments were prohibited. This 
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restriction turned out to be counter-productive and damaged accuracy: forecasters no longer 
adjusted when it was necessary, and made more overly large adjustments. So, when developing a 
forecast support system, we have to take the acceptance by the user into account. Forecasters 
should be able to retain their sense of ownership (Silver, 1991). Thus, we tested a forecast support 
system which allowed for the integration of judgment into the model itself. The properties of the 
dataset and the different methods were analysed in-depth (direction and size of adjustments, 
volatility of the data measured in two ways).  We linked the model to demand planning by the use of 
an optimization model, distinguished between different hierarchical levels (as recommended by 
Kremer, et al., 2015), and provided information on profitability. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study to provide such data. We found that the model eliminated the harmful effects of 
judgment when the latter was applied wrongfully. However, in some cases the restrictive model, or 
the classic case of judgmental adjustment, proved to be beneficial. We confirmed previous 
literature, in that medium sized and big adjustments appear to be beneficial, as well as downward 
adjustments and adjustments in case of high volatility. Presumably, this is because these 
adjustments stem from knowledge that is not yet integrated in the statistical forecasting model. This 
is in contrast with small adjustments, adjustments in the case of low volatility and positive 
adjustments, which are more likely to be the result of the illusion of control effect, or an inherent 
optimism bias (Fildes, et al., 2009). 
Second, we employed the experimental method for fundamental research into the biases 
associated with providing forecasts from a statistical model to a judgmental forecaster. In our 
experiments, we set out to compare unaided judgment and judgment aided by (different types of) 
statistical forecasts. In Chapter 3, we asked whether judgmental forecasts would improve when we 
provided a statistical forecast. We found that performance was in fact impaired, compared to 
unaided judgmental forecasting. While previous studies found lack of use or insufficient use of such 
forecasts (e.g., Goodwin & Fildes, 1999; Lim & O'Connor, 1995), we found a damaging effect when 
compared to unaided judgmental forecasting. Further testing of the experiment, but with a lower 
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proportion of promotions, resulted in a lowering of the overall error and, importantly, in a 
disappearance of the detrimental effect of a statistical forecast on predicting the value of normal 
periods. Given that very little adjustment from the mean was necessary for normal periods in the 
experiment with a low proportion of promotions, we concluded that the presence of the statistical 
forecast interfered with the adjustment process. Importantly, this suggests that we need to be 
careful in viewing statistical forecasts as universally better than unaided judgment when forecasting 
from time series disturbed by exogenous events. As this was a novel experimental finding, but one 
that was quite robust across our three experiments, we set out to investigate this further in the 
fourth Chapter.  
Rather than varying the forecasting task (with or without provision of a statistical forecast) 
within participants, this variable was manipulated between participants. One group of participants 
never received a statistical forecast and had to rely solely on their judgment. Another group received 
a statistical forecast in a similar way to participants in the experiments reported in Chapter 3. 
Perhaps the detrimental effect obtained in the previous study was due to the inadequacy of the type 
of statistical forecast. A third group received a forecast based on series cleansed of promotional 
effects. While this does not appear to be common practice (e.g., Fildes, et al., 2009; Trapero, et al., 
2013), it is the most common method used in past experimental research (e.g., Goodwin & Fildes, 
1999; Goodwin, et al., 2011). Previous studies comparing the effect of the initial quality of the 
forecast are scarce (except for Lim & O'Connor, 1995). In this set-up, the formal method proved 
beneficial for forecasting accuracy, regardless of the basis of the forecast: both cleansed and non-
cleansed forecasts led to an improvement in forecasting. Decomposing the error taught us that the 
benefit of providing a statistical forecast lies in the reduction of the Variable Error (scatter). While 
there was an improvement in accuracy with the presence of a statistical forecast, a large amount of 
error still persisted, both in forecasting normal periods and promotions. We tested an additional 
type of statistical forecast in a second experiment: one based on cleansed series and with an 
additional uplift for promotional periods. This optimal forecast led to a significantly better 
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performance, but was still not optimal. It seems that even with an optimal forecast, the tendency to 
adjust persists.  
In this doctoral thesis, damaging adjustments were found across the different samples: both 
by novices in a controlled, experimental setting, and by the professional forecasters of the publishing 
company (in the restricted judgment model). Chapter 3 and 4 indicate that the introduction of a 
formal forecast is associated with potential problems. In Chapter 3 the presence of a statistical 
forecast led to a worse performance. In Chapter 4 it led to a better performance but still far from 
optimal – even with an optimal statistical forecast (see below for an in-depth analysis of the cause of 
the difference in findings). Lack of use and limited use of statistical forecasts is a persistent problem 
in judgmental forecasting (Lawrence, et al., 2006; Önkal, et al., 2009). The integrative approach of 
Chapter 2 can provide a future avenue for de-biasing the combination of judgment and statistics. 
However, it must be noted that, while it eliminated the harmful type of adjustments, it also reduced 
the advantages of restrictive judgment. 
2. Methodological contributions 
The difference between the findings of Chapters 3 and 4 makes for an interesting 
methodological finding. In Chapter 3, we found that the provision of a statistical forecast damaged 
accuracy. In Chapter 4, it improved forecasting accuracy. This finding is surprising, as there are many 
similarities in both studies. In all experiments, the same stimulus material was used and the sample 
was similar. The only difference was in the experimental design: Experiment 1, 2 and 3 of Chapter 3 
were within-subject designs with respect to the focal variable (presence or absence of the statistical 
forecast). Each participant received 40 trials, of which (at random) half contained a statistical forecast 
and half did not. In Chapter 4, each participant received 40 trials as well. However, they received either 
all trials with a statistical forecast, or all trials without a forecast (unaided judgment). In Chapter 4, the 
within-subjects manipulation was the number of promotions (40% versus 10%). This was based on the 
findings of Experiment 1 (40% promotions) and Experiment 3 (10% promotions) of Chapter 3.  So what 
caused the difference between the findings in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4? It seems that the context in 
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which the forecasting task is performed has a significant effect on the difficulty of the task. Looking at 
mean absolute errors, we can compare several condition types across experiments (see Table 1).  
 
  Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Unaided 
judgment 
40% promotions Exp 1: 20 unaided judgment 
trials 
Exp 1, Condition 1: 20 trials with 
40%  promotions  
10% promotions Exp 3: 20 unaided judgment 
trials 
Exp 1, Condition 1: 20 trials with 






40% promotions Exp 1: 20 trials aided with a 
statistical forecast 
Exp 1, Condition 3: 20 trials with 
40%  promotions 
10% promotions Exp 3: 20 trials aided with a 
statistical forecast 
Exp 1, Condition 3: 20 trials with 
10%  promotions 
Table 1. Comparisons across experiments 
 
Table 2 provides a comparison as described above. Looking at the experiment results in the 
first column, where the presence of the statistical forecast was manipulated within subjects, the 
error for unaided judgment is lower than the error for aided judgment. This is true both for the 40% 
promotion trials as the 10% promotion trials. Looking at the results in column 2 of the experiment 
where the statistical forecast was manipulated between subjects, we see that the opposite is true: 
the error for unaided judgment is higher than the error for aided judgment. This is again regardless 
of the amount of promotions.  
Independent Variables Experimental design  





31.13 31.22 -.06 .954 






33.70 29.12 3.66 .000 
26.02 24.81 .881 .381 
Table 2. Comparison of MAE across Experiments of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
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Now, comparing across experiments and across Chapters, we can investigate where this 
difference occurs. If we look at the 40% promotion conditions across experiments, we find a first 
clue. The MAE for 40% promotions is not significantly different for unaided judgment in the within-
subject trials (MAE = 31.13, SD = 8.30) compared to unaided judgment in the between-subject trials 
(MAE = 31.13, SD = 8.30; t (88) = -.06, p = .954). Thus, for unaided judgment with a high frequency of 
promotions, performance is consistent, regardless of the methodological set-up. 
It is only in the comparison with a statistical forecast, that a difference emerges: participants 
forecasted worse when a statistical forecast appeared in the within-subjects experiment (MAE = 
33.70, SD = 5.94). However, in the between-subjects design, those participants that always received 
a statistical forecast, performed better than those who always relied solely on their judgment in the 
40% promotions trials (MAE = 29.12, SD = 5.93). One possible explanation is that the appearance of a 
statistical forecast confused participants in the within-subjects variation. They were thrown off their 
game and started making more mistakes, due to an increased complexity of the task. Looking at 
cognitive psychology literature, it appears that the frequent task switching introduced error in the 
within-subjects experiment. Task-switching has two effects on performance: a transient cost is 
introduced by the switching, resulting in increased response time and often a higher error rate and a 
long-term cost, such that responses remain slower throughout the trials compared to a block with 
only one type of trials (Monsell, 2003). These costs are due to reconfiguration required of the task, 
such as a shift of attention (in this case, the introduction of an additional line on the graph) or a 
change in action rules (in this case, taking into account the ‘advice’ of the statistical forecast). 
Looking at the low proportion of promotions trials, the pattern is different. Participants who 
forecasted all trials with only 10% promotions (MAE = 23.51, SD = 5.59), performed better when 
forecasting with judgment alone (within-subjects), than those in the unaided judgment condition 
(between-subjects) who switched between 10% and 40% promotions (MAE = 28.93, SD = 7.02; t (87) 
= -3.93, p < .001). When provided with a statistical forecast, the performance of the within-subjects 
group deteriorated (MAE = 26.02, SD = 6.20). In the between-subjects design, the participants that 
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were provided with a statistical forecast in every trial (between-subjects, MAE = 24.81, SD = 6.60), 
had a better performance than those who forecast unaided in every trial. Further investigation here 
is necessary. A possible way forward here is to work with a block design. Ideally, to eliminate all 
effects of task-switching, both frequency of promotions (10% vs. 40%) and statistical forecast 
(present vs. absent) should be manipulated within-subjects. This would result in four between-
subject conditions: unaided judgment with a low frequency of promotions, unaided judgment with a 
high frequency of promotions, aided judgment with a low frequency and aided judgment with a high 
frequency.  
Another interesting avenue would be to look into the effect of switching after a long block of 
identical trial types. If participants have 20 occurrences of unaided judgment with a low frequency, 
will their performance drop after the introduction of a statistical forecast? A potential outcome 
could be that performance increases in the first twenty trials due to learning, and then drops 
significantly after switching to the other type. Thus, the research questions would be: do participants 
learn across trials? Is this learning disturbed by switching from unaided judgment to aided judgment 
or vice versa? We can already provide an indication. Let us take, for example, the results of the third 
within-subjects experiment. Error was lowest in the third experiment (10% promotions); we can 
therefore assume that the effect of switching tasks was least disturbed by other variables. Do 





Figure 1. MAE across trial types 
To investigate this statistically, we regressed the MAE on the trial number. This confirmed that 
the trial number does not significantly predict the MAE (F (1, 38) = .39, p = .537; R² = .01)5. To test 
whether participants might have taken a few trials to learn, the regression analysis was run again but 
with blocked trials: the 40 trials were divided into 5 learning blocks. The regression analysis again 
indicated that there was not a significant learning effect across blocks (F (1, 38) = .23, p = .635; R² = 
.01). A potential explanation is that the learning process was disturbed by the random switching 
from trial types with a statistical forecast to those without a statistical forecast. To investigate this, 
we looked at the trial order for every participant. For every subsequent trial number, we coded 
whether this was the same or a different trial type with regard to the presence of the statistical 
forecast (see Figure 2).  
  
                                                            
5 The regression analyses for Chapter 4 were similarly non-significant for learning effects for unaided judgment 
(F (1, 38) = 1.38, p = .248; R² = .04), judgment aided with a forecast based on cleansed series (F (1, 38) = .24, p = 
.628; R² = .01), aided with a forecast based on non-cleansed series (F (1, 38) = 1.87, p = .179; R² = .05) and 
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Figure 2. Categorization of trial types 
 
We can ask whether participants who had more switches performed worse. It appears that 
there is no correlation between number of switches and the Mean Absolute Error (r (38) = -.188, p = 
.259). To look more closely at these results, we will need a blocked design (as described above) 
without the task switching from the current dataset.  
 
3. Theoretical implications 
Empirical and theoretical studies regarding judgmental adjustment (i.e., ‘restrictive 
judgment’ in Chapter 2, ‘aided judgment’ in Chapter 3 and 4) and judgmental forecasting are 
relatively scarce. The 2009 study of Fildes et al. (2009) re-started the stream of judgmental 
adjustment research since the landmark studies of Mathews and Diamantopolous (1986, 1989, 
1990, 1992). The studies that have followed since (e.g., Franses & Legerstee, 2009; Trapero, et al., 
2013) have focussed on contributing to empirical work. Recently, Syntetos, Babai, Boylan, Kolassa, 
and Nikolopoulos (2016, p. 15) remarked that “.. there is still considerable space for empirical 
investigations and more importantly theoretical and methodological contributions towards 
identifying the specific conditions under which judgmental adjustments do lead to improvements in 
forecast accuracy and forecast utility”. They further state that, with the exception of Syntetos, 
Georgantzas, Boylan, and Dangerfield (2011), no papers currently exist within the operational 
Part. trial 1 trial 2 trial 3 trial 4 trial 5 
1 NO SF SF SF NO 
2 NO NO NO NO SF 
3 NO NO NO NO NO 
 4 SF NO NO NO NO 
5 SF NO SF SF SF 
Part. trial 1 trial 2 trial 3 trial 4 trial 5 
1  Diff Same Same Diff 
2  Same Same Same Diff 
3  Same Same Same Same 
4  Diff Same Same Same 
5  Diff Diff Same Same 
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research framework (in which the study in Chapter 2 is situated) that use formal models. Theoretical 
frameworks for judgmental adjustment as such do not exist, to the best of our knowledge. However, 
we can look at the broader field in which judgmental forecasting is situated: therefore, I first situate 
these studies at the cross-roads between Economics and Psychology.  
 
3.1 Economics 
A theory that goes back to the late sixties, but is still relevant today, is the Theory of 
Combining Forecasts (Bates & Granger, 1969). It recognizes that different models may be able to 
capture different, independent information and that by combining we can capture reality more 
accurately. Bates and Granger (1969) state one condition that poses a problem for applying the 
theory to judgmental adjustment research: namely, that the nature of the individual forecasts must 
be unbiased. A first step is therefore to check for unbiasedness and should bias be present, to 
correct for it. Bates and Granger (1969) suggest that this should be done via a correction for the 
average percentage (or absolute) bias. The study of Chapter 2 can be placed under this Theory for 
Combining Forecasts. The basic statistical model is outperformed on a number of occasions by the 
restrictive judgment model (combination via judgmental adjustment). However, in some cases 
restrictive judgment was harmful. Small adjustments for instance, were harmful and explained by 
the illusion of control effect, violating the unbiasedness assumption of the Theory of Combining 
Forecasts. Thus, we corrected them via the integrative judgment approach. After this correction, the 
combination of forecasts outperformed the single method of the statistical model, as we would 
expect within the framework of the Theory of Combining Forecasts.  
Later theories have focussed on singular models for forecasting. Hendry and Clements 
(2003) discuss the failure of Basic Economic Theory as a framework for economic forecasting. The 
two main assumptions of this theory state that the model is a good representation of the economy, 
and the structure of the economy remains unchanged. Unsurprisingly, both assumptions are violated 
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in reality. A less stringent theory is the Forecasting Theory proposed by Clements and Hendry (1999), 
based on the assumptions that models are simplified representations of reality and economies can 
change. The first assumption allows for error in the model, while the second recognizes the instable 
nature of time series. Both assumptions can be applied to forecasting beyond economic series: 
organizational forecasting is equally subject to error in their models and change in the environment. 
Overall, it appears that the oldest theory of all, is still most applicable – finding predictive accuracy in 
the combination of models. 
 
3.2 Psychology 
Across experiments in Chapter 3 and 4, we find evidence of under- and over-forecasting. 
Looking at the other overarching field of judgmental forecasting, Psychology, we find evidence in 
Cognitive Bias theory.  Cognitive biases are deviations from rational, prescribed, or ideal judgments 
(Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996). The deviations are different from random error, in that they are 
predictable and systematic (Arnott, 2006; Kerr, et al., 1996). Many different taxonomies of biases 
exist (e.g., Haselton et al., 2009; Oreg & Bayazit, 2009). The most relevant to the studies in this 
doctoral thesis is the very first taxonomy of cognitive biases, by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). They 
defined three main biases: representativeness, availability, and anchor-and-adjust. The latter bias is 
especially relevant for judgmental adjustment. The studies of Chapter 3 and 4 illustrate how 
forecasters take an initial value, being the statistical forecast, the mean of the series or the last data 
point, and adjust insufficiently upwards or downwards.  
Other relevant theories from the field of psychology relate back to the task switching effect 
we mentioned above. Several theories relating to the study of judgment highlight that judgment 
cannot be understood or studied without taking the environment or the task into account (e.g., 
Cognitive Continuum Theory, Social Judgment Theory; Hammond, 1981; Hammond, Stewart, 
Brehmer, & Steinman, 1975). Cognitive Continuum Theory (Hammond, 1981) for instance, states 
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that the task has three characteristics: complexity of the structure, ambiguity of the content, and 
form of the representation. The randomization of the trials in our experiments might have increased 
the complexity of the structure, such that it interfered with the performance of the participants. 
 
3.3 Specific contributions 
The paragraphs above situate the studies of this doctoral thesis within the broader fields of 
economics and psychology. Moving away from the large theoretical frameworks of the overarching 
fields of forecasting, we can specify a number of contributions to sub-fields of forecasting. Looking at 
forecasting with judgment aided by Forecast Support Systems, Chapter 2 contributes by testing the 
theory that the incorporation of judgment into the forecasting model itself would be beneficial for 
forecasting accuracy. It appears that it can compensate for damaging adjustments. Yet, restrictive 
judgment sometimes outperformed integrative judgment. Forecast support systems will need to be 
able to recognize when judgment is better than its automated counterpart. Chapter 4, Experiment 1, 
showed us why statistical forecasts are able to improve judgment when they are provided as aid: 
they reduce variable error and make the forecasts more consistent. Experiment 2 with an optimal 
forecast showed that a forecast able to incorporate promotional effects can result in a significant 
drop in overall error (MAE). For the literature on forecasting promotions, we refer back to the 
contributions mentioned above on anchoring bias. Lastly, in Chapter 4 we theorized about the 
process involved in forecasting from disturbed series. It appears that a two-stage process is involved, 
whereby people first create an internal baseline of the series based on the overall perceived mean. 
Second, they adjust for the estimated effect of the perturbations.  
4. Managerial implications 
An important task for researchers in the field of judgmental forecasting, is to explore avenues 
that may contribute to the improvement of forecasting accuracy in practice (Sanders & Manrodt, 
2003). Increased understanding of the forecasting process is of critical importance for today’s 
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organizations, as it offers the potential for a competitive advantage in forecasting. It is therefore vital 
for managers to gain a more complete understanding of the forecasting process and the possible 
influencing factors (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007; Giullian, et al., 2000; Makridakis & Gaba, 1998; Shim, 
2000). Forecasting can be labour intensive, and therefore a costly and time consuming process, 
especially if time is invested in adjusting statistical results (Adya, Collopy, Armstrong, & Kennedy, 
2001; Mathews & Diamantopolous, 1989). Studying possible ways to unify judgment and formal 
models in an optimal manner can provide direction for efficient cost and time investments. Research 
may provide businesses with a measurable foundation for strategic decisions such as staff planning 
and ICT processes, optimizing output and quality, cost efficiency, and risk management. More 
concretely, this will lead to increased profits: even small improvements in predictive performance can 
have a substantial impact on a firm’s profitability (Steenburgh, et al., 2003), as was confirmed in the 
results of Chapter 2. That Chapter is highly relevant to management practice, as it offers a solution for 
using both statistical models and judgmental adjustment, without the known damaging effects of the 
latter. Research has long since proven that judgmental adjustments, while holding much potential, 
suffer from persistent biases (Eroglu & Croxton, 2010; Fildes, et al., 2009; Webby & O’Connor, 1996). 
The provision of a decision support system can alleviate these biases (Fildes, et al., 2006); however, 
the introduction of these support systems is often met with resistance (Goodwin, et al., 2007). In a 
similar way to the company which provided us the dataset, other companies could adopt the 
integrative judgment method to improve performance, while allowing for the input of the forecaster. 
Importantly, this study confirmed the findings of Fildes, et al. (2009), in that there are certain 
circumstances under which we should trust judgment: medium to large adjustments, high volatility, 
downward adjustments. It should be noted that following the study documented in Chapter 2, the 
company involved is cultivating a forecasting culture where the forecasters are motivated to use the 
integrative approach. 
The tentative message of Chapter 3 is: be cautious in using statistical forecasts when dealing 
with time series with promotions. However, Chapter 4 suggests otherwise. Given that the situation of 
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Chapter 3 is less likely to appear in practice (forecasters rarely forecast the time series with and 
without statistical forecasts), the focus will lie on the managerial relevance of Chapter 4. This does not 
however, take away from the important methodological finding that a difference in experimental 
design can lead to opposite results. This is more of an academic take-away point, with greater 
relevance to psychology and experimental research, than it is for business practice.  
In Chapter 4, we bridged a gap between experimental design and research practice: the nature 
of the statistical forecast. An important message for management practice is that the provision of a 
statistical forecast helps to improve performance, even if it is a crude forecast that is provided. 
Additionally, it appears that the time, cost and effort invested in cleaning the data is not warranted. 
Looking specifically at promotions, the experiments suggest that forecasts are heavily subject to 
anchoring bias. Promotional values were consistently under-forecasted. A suggestion for business 
practice could therefore lie in the format in which they ask for such forecasts. The anchoring could be 
avoided by not working with an elevation on a graph, but by asking the forecasters to forecast a 
percentage increase or an absolute number. This can be added to the graph in a next step, if the 
company prefers a visual representation. It should be noted that when taking this approach, the 
forecaster is vulnerable to optimism bias (over-forecasting desirable quantities) leading to a reversal 
of the initial under-forecasting.   
 
5. Limitations, strengths and further research 
By employing both a company sample with forecasts made by experts (Chapter 2), and 
experiments with student participants (Chapter 3 and 4), this doctoral thesis attempts to balance out 
the advantages and disadvantages associated with both methods. A company sample has the 
advantage of having genuine forecasters as participants, using real-life data, subject to context effects. 
Given the considerable impact of the organizational context on forecasting performance (Adelman, 
1981; Franses, 2013; Sniezek, 1986; Wright & Goodwin, 1998), studies like this should be an important 
part of judgmental forecasting research. A complex context will complicate the analysability of the 
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forecasting task in practice. Yet, what makes the organizational context so interesting for judgmental 
forecasting research, is exactly what makes it so difficult to investigate and, certainly, to generalize 
from. As Reimers and Harvey (2011) and Harvey and Reimers (2013) conclude from their experimental, 
non-laboratory studies: specific organizations use specific data series. Because of their previous 
experience (ecological knowledge) people assumed that time series were positively auto-correlated 
and were unable to regress to the mean. Harvey and Reimers (2013) suggest that participants engaged 
in damping (or anti-damping) in a single series, depending on their expectation of the curve compared 
to what they experience in their environment. If the curve in the single series was steeper than they 
expected, they engaged in damping. If it was more shallow, they engaged in anti-damping. This 
suggests that people base their expectations for forecasting on experience with the broader 
environment, and not just the time series. This means that in an organization, experts have experience 
with a specific type of data series and a specific type of context. Field studies have to be careful in 
drawing generalizable conclusions. An experimental design on the other hand, using ‘neutral’ 
participants, enables us to investigate the ‘pure’ effects of judgmental forecasting, without the 
interference of a variable context. Using artificial series, for instance, provide certainty about the 
statistical underlying model and the optimal forecast.  
An often heard criticism pertains to the use of student participants. Participants are essentially 
dealing with tasks that are unfamiliar to them. However, novices and experts are subject to the same 
heuristics and biases (Kahneman, 1991). Northcraft and Neale (1987), for instance, found that both 
novices and experts were prone to the anchor-and-adjust-heuristic in a study with real estate 
property. An identical susceptibility to cognitive biases regardless of expertise has been found in a 
variety of domains (e.g., Leventhal, Teasley, & Rohlman, 1994; McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982; 
Waylen, Horswill, Alexander, & McKenna, 2004). Even an inverse expertise effect has been found 
(Önkal & Muradoǧlu, 1994; Yates, et al., 1991). Bolger & Wright (1994) document twenty studies that 
compare expert with novice decision making. Only 6 out of 20 studies showed better performance in 
experts than in novices, 9 showed worse performance (inverse expertise effect) and the remaining 5 
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showed equal performance. Their main conclusion is that, when there is a weak or absent feedback 
loop, expert judgment is not likely to outperform judgment of non-experts. 
With regard to Chapter 2, the main guideline for further research would be the replication of 
this study in other types of environments. It is necessary that we know where our approach works and 
where it doesn’t. There is room for further optimization of the system: it tended to dampen the 
positive effects of judgmental adjustment. Interviews about the acceptability of this type of decision 
support system could also be relevant. With regard to Chapter 3 and 4, the blocked design as 
recommended above seems crucial in further understanding the effects of providing a statistical 
forecast to a judgmental forecaster, in time series with perturbances, without task switching. 
Additionally, it would be interesting to see what happens when we provide feedback. Benson and 
Önkal (1992) distinguish between four types of forecasting feedback: (1) outcome feedback (providing 
the latest outcome), (2) performance feedback (giving the forecaster information on his or her 
accuracy), (3) cognitive process feedback (informing the forecaster about his or her forecasting 
strategy) and (4) task properties feedback (giving the forecaster statistical information about the task). 
According to Fischer and Harvey (1999), people only learn from outcome feedback when the task is 
fairly simple, i.e. two or three cues maximum and a linear relation to the criterion. When the task is 
more complex, cognitive feedback is more useful (summarizing the relation between responses and 
criterion values/values of the various cues). A similar study to ours could potentially benefit from 
outcome feedback. This method should be easily applicable in practice to enhance forecasting 
accuracy. 
Ideally, further judgmental forecasting research will focus on both approaches used in this 
doctoral thesis : fundamental experimental research to test the basic relations between judgment and 
models, how people make decisions, how they react; and research in business practice, as we need to 
test our conclusions on behaviour in companies. Ideally, a direct line of communication should exist 
between research and practice. Practice should employ the latest findings of basic, fundamental 
research, in order to improve forecasting performance. Simultaneously, researchers should 
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acknowledge the ways of practice, including limitations and habits, and take these into account when 
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